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Abstract
In the first chapter, I examine the returns to education for both males and females with a par-
ticular focus on the effect of wage risk and periods of non-employment. I also account for
selection in to the labour market using a Heckman selection equation and decompose earn-
ings in to permanent and transitory components in an effort to understand the components
of wage risk. My results suggest that failure to account for periods of non-employment,
wage risk and selection in to the labour market when calculating returns to education leads
to biased estimates.
In the second chapter, along with my co-author, Paul Devereux, we look at the causal
effect of education on earnings uncertainty and volatility and the effect of education on
sheltering workers from the adverse effects of recessions. We use the 1973 change in com-
pulsory schooling law to provide exogenous variation in education. Our regression discon-
tinuity estimates suggest that men whose education was increased by the law subsequently
had lower earnings volatility, less pro-cyclical earnings, and were less likely to experience
real pay cuts.
In the third chapter, I analyse the role of risk, family background, cognitive and non-
cognitive skills in determining college attendance. I use a structural life cycle model ex-
plicitly capturing the decision to go to college and incorporating important features which
impact the returns to college such as savings, labour supply, human capital accumulation
and depreciation, wage risk and employment risk. It is estimated that grants, parental back-
ground, non-cognitive skills and risk significantly impact the decision to go to college.
However, the biggest factor in determining college attendance is cognitive skills. This is
driven both by differences in returns to college conditional on cognitive skills and by the
larger psychic costs faced by those with low cognitive skills.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is much evidence to suggest that having more education leads to positive labour mar-
ket returns in the form of higher earnings. However, there is little evidence about whether
education reduces earnings risk or how risk impacts the decision to go to college. This the-
sis takes a rigorous account of the role of risk in education using both rich UK household
data and large administrative panel data.
To start with I look at how standard returns to education change once we allow for risk
to impact returns. The literature on returns to education has been focused on obtaining the
causal return to education absent of any endogeneity. While obtaining the correct causal
estimate is important, this preoccupation has led the literature to omit other equally impor-
tant facets in returns to education. Investing in education is risky as there is no guarantee of
any future income stream and moreover no insurance market to insure against low returns.
Therefore, the return to education should be augmented to allow for the fact that individuals
do not like risk and so would prefer a more stable earnings stream even if the average return
is smaller. It might be difficult to directly say how wage risk may impact returns but it is
plausible to imagine that accounting for employment risk will tend to increase the returns
to education since those with higher education have higher employment rates and so are
in receipt of income for a larger fraction of their lives. Ignoring employment differentials
across education levels implicitly assumes that unemployment rates are education invariant.
In chapter two, I examine the returns to education for both males and females focusing on
the effect of both wage risk and employment risk. I also account for selection in to the
labour market using a Heckman selection equation to account for the fact that those who
are in work may be different than those who are not in work which may be more important
for females. Understanding the sources of wage risk is important from a policy perspective,
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the welfare effects of transitory shocks may not be so large if such shocks can be easily
smoothed from savings or the tax and transfer system. On the other hand permanent shocks
which are long lasting will have large effects on welfare. Therefore I decompose wages
in to both transitory and permanent shocks and only allow permanent shocks to impact re-
turns. I find unadjusted returns to education similar to previous estimates in the range of 6
to 7 percent. Accounting for employment risk leads to quite substantial changes in returns
particulary for high school graduates while the wage risk adjusted returns are much smaller.
Correcting for non random selection in to the labour market results in small changes in
returns for males but quite significant changes for females. My results suggest that fail-
ure to account for employment risk, wage risk and selection in to the labour market when
calculating returns to education leads to biased estimates.
In chapter 3, along with my co-author, Paul Devereux, we look at the direct causal ef-
fect of education on labour market risk. More specifically we examine the effect of an extra
year of schooling on wage volatility, wage cyclicality and the probability of getting a wage
cut. We allow the effects to vary over the life cycle. There is little causal evidence about
whether education reduces earnings uncertainty and volatility or helps to shelter workers
from the adverse effects of recessions. To address endogeneity of schooling we use the
raising of the school leaving age from 15 to 16 in the UK in 1973. Combined with the New
Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) which is a large administrative dataset that follows
1 percent UK workers this allows us to use a regression discontinuity design to examine the
causal impact of an extra year of education on each of our risk outcomes. Our estimates
suggest that men whose education was increased by the law subsequently had lower earn-
ings volatility, less pro-cyclical earnings, and were less likely to experience real pay cuts.
In general, these effects were larger for men aged less than 40. Our results provide another
avenue through which education may lead to an increase in welfare.
To take the thesis full circle, I look at why people choose to go to college in the first
place and the importance of risk, ability and family background. I use a structural life cycle
model to address these questions. While returns to college are estimated to be somewhere
between 30 and 60 percent, still less than half of people in the UK go to college. If individ-
uals are fully optimising then it must be that they take non-pecuniary aspects of college in
to consideration. To account for this, I allow psychic costs to impact the decision to go to
college to capture the fact that those with lower cognitive skills may lack the ability to do
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the coursework while those with lower non-cognitive skills may not have the determination,
self application or perseverance to finish the course. In addition, family background will
play a vital role by providing children with an environment more conducive to skill acqui-
sition and a culture which makes college going a given. I estimate a rich structural model
which explicitly captures the decision to go to college and incorporates important features
which impact the returns to college such as savings, labour supply, human capital accu-
mulation and depreciation, wage risk and employment risk. The model is estimated using
rich UK cohort data containing early measures of both cognitive and non-cognitive abil-
ity, in addition to rich family background information. It is estimated that grants, parental
background, non-cognitive ability and risk significantly impact the decision to go to col-
lege. However, the biggest factor in determining college attendance is cognitive ability; if
high school graduates had the same cognitive ability distribution as college graduates then
college attendance would increase by roughly 20%. This is driven both by differences in
returns to college conditional on ability and by the larger psychic costs faced by those with
low ability. This suggests that policies aimed at increasing the cognitive ability of individ-




The returns to education is one of the most widely researched topics in economics. Hun-
dreds of papers have been written using a variety of different techniques and using many
different countries but there is still no general consensus on what the returns to education
actually are. Early studies followed the Mincer set up and regressed log earnings on years
of schooling and a quadratic in experience and took the coefficient on years of schooling
to be the return (Mincer, (1974)). Criticism of this approach for failure to control for the
endogeneity of schooling led to a plethora of papers making use of instrumental variables
techniques which attempt to exogenously isolate the causal effect of schooling on earnings
(see Card 1995 for a review). However, despite the huge number of papers examining the
returns to education, there is a dearth of papers which incorporate risk. Since almost all
investment decisions, be they property investment decisions, investment in stocks or setting
up a new business involve some consideration of the amount of risk involved and the risk
return trade off, it is surprising that such an important factor is almost completely omitted in
the literature. Human capital like any other investment is subject to the perils of risk and so
it is imperative to include this when analysing the return. An individual deciding whether
to invest in education faces a huge amount of uncertainty concerning future labour mar-
ket conditions, completion of the schooling level, length of life, future earnings and what
fraction of time will be spent in employment. In this paper I focus on the effect of unem-
ployment risk and wage risk. Given that there does not exist any market that insures against
low returns to education this is a very important topic and may explain part of the reason
why many students do not progress to further education despite the perceived benefits. In-
vesting in education does not guarantee that one will obtain a high paying job; indeed due
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to the skewed nature of the earnings distribution many people will earn significantly less
than mean earnings. Income levels among observationally similar people may differ due
to luck, social connectedness, illness, promotions, ability, different training opportunities
or motivation and therefore there is a wide range of potential earnings outcomes that may
be realised.Thus it is likely that individuals care not only about the mean of the earnings
distribution but also the variance.1 The variance is a measure of risk and if an individual
is mildly risk averse they will prefer the earnings distribution with the lower variance con-
ditional on the mean being the same. The returns to education will differ if one attempts
to adjust for the riskiness of different education levels although the effects of employment
risk and wage risk are not clear cut. If higher educated individuals have lower risk of un-
employment then their lifetime expected earnings will be higher and this will increase the
returns to education. On the other hand if increased education comes at the cost of higher
wage risk then individuals will place less value on higher education and the returns will be
lower. Higher educated males have higher employment rates due to higher levels of human
capital, they are less likely to be fired due to higher training costs and in addition they can
downgrade in times of economic downturn, all of which contributes to a lower risk of unem-
ployment. For females it is not so clear how the returns to schooling may be biased. Higher
educated females have a higher probability of finding a job but for many reasons may de-
cide not to participate in the labour force. The opportunity cost of being out of the labour
market is higher for more educated than for less educated females and therefore it is more
costly for higher educated females to not participate in the labour market; however if there
is assortative mating, higher educated females may choose to opt out of the labor market
due to higher household earnings. Lower educated females on the other hand have lower
income and therefore due to financial reasons would like to participate in the labour market
but as it is harder for lower educated women to find a job they may be discouraged from
looking. Despite the fact that the low educated have higher unemployment probabilities,
unemployment benefits represent a large chunk of their pre-displacement income and this
may be enough to negate the adverse effects of employment. Added to this, the existence
of minimum wage laws provide a lower bound to the wage that one can receive and so this
may make the risk adjusted returns smaller than one may have previously thought.
As alluded to at the beginning, the literature is scant with research on this topic. Weiss
1If returns are normally distributed this is enough to summarise the entire distribution.
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(1972) looks at the risk in occupation and education using data on scientists in the US. In
his model an individual seeks to maximize the expected discounted sum of future returns
with utility dependent on current income only; the subjective discount rate that equates two
earnings streams is used to estimate the return to education. His measure of risk is the coef-
ficient of variation. He finds that risk is decreasing in education and suggests that this may
be because “more educated scientists are not only more productive but also more uniform in
their skills, abilities and attitudes”. He finds that the inclusion of risk has negligible effects
on rates of returns but that increasing the degree of risk aversion substantially reduces the
return to education (despite the smaller coefficient of variation) due to decreasing marginal
utility. Olson, Shefrin and White (1979) estimate a model similar to Weiss but allow bor-
rowing while in school with repayments being made in fixed instalments once schooling has
been completed. They use the residual from a regression of log earnings on a set of fixed
and time varying covariates such as marital status and region and find that risk adjusted
returns to college are small but positive. Nickell (1979) using UK data finds that after cor-
recting for unemployment, the return to education using pre-tax weekly income rises by 0.6
percentage points. However including unemployment benefits and using post-tax weekly
income leads the adjusted rate of return to rise by only 0.2 percentage points. He concludes
that “the monetary impact of the extra schooling, insofar as it reduces the chances of un-
employment, is of no great consequence”. Pistaferri and Padula using both US and Italian
data find the returns to education are significantly higher when accounting for both wage
and employment risk.
In this paper I analyse the returns to different education levels: college versus high
school and high school versus less than high school. In keeping with earlier studies I use
the IRR framework to back out the rate of return but undertake a more rigorous analysis of
the amount of risk involved in each education level by separating the risk in to permanent
and transitory components. In addition I look at the returns for both males and females,
correct for endogenous labour market participation and use UK data.
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where 1− γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ is the discount rate and Es is the
expectation operator conditional on information at time s and T is the retirement age which
is assumed known with certainty at the beginning of life. In this paper I abstract from
consumption and thus implicitly assume that individuals care only about lifetime income.
This would be the case if there were incomplete markets with no borrowing or saving.
Although this may seem like a strong limitation of the paper, the literature on returns to
education focus almost exclusively on the effect of education on earnings rather than utility
and therefore my set up will be useful for comparisons with previous estimates.
Following Becker (1964) and Hanoch (1967) the internal rate of return (IRR) is defined
as the discount rate that equates the present value of the discounted net lifetime earnings for














In this equation t denotes the school leaving age at which the lowest of the two school-
ing levels being evaluated is, while s and s’ denote the two education levels being com-
pared. I assume individuals with academic qualifications lower than a high school degree
leave school at 16 and enter the labour market at age 17, those with a high school degree
finish at 18 and enter the labour market at 19 while and those with a college degree are
assumed to enter the labour market at 22 allowing them to stay in college until age twenty
one. It is assumed that the retirement age is independent of education level and is set at age
sixty five.2 When comparing high school graduates and those with less than high school
it is assumed that the earnings of those with a high school degree is zero while in school
2Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) find that allowing the retirement age to differ by education level does
not lead to large changes since the earnings at the end of the life are so heavily discounted.
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but they face no living costs. It is assumed that those in college have zero earnings while
attending college but pay 5,000 pounds a year throughout their 3 years in college.3 This set
up is advantageous over the standard Mincer regression in obtaining the IRR since the co-
efficient on schooling does not give an estimate of the IRR except under certain conditions
which Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) find to be rejected in recent data. The Mincer
approach gives an estimate of the growth rate of earnings with schooling. An individual de-
ciding whether to quit schooling and enter the labour market or to continue with schooling
will be most interested in the internal rate of return which requires explicitly accounting for
all costs and benefits associated with each schooling level. The income process is estimated
assuming income is log normally distributed lnyi j ∼ N and the moments are converted back
using standard log normal formulae:
Es[yi j(s)] = exp(Es[lnyi j(s)]+0.5vars[lnyi j(s)])
vars[yi j(s)] = exp(2Es[lnyi j(s)]+ vars[lnyi j(s)])(exp(vars[lnyi j(s)])−1)














In terms of risk neutrality, that is when γ is equal to 1, the second part of the equation
drops out and the utility is solely dependent on the mean of the distribution. When γ is equal
to zero then it is a log utility function and the Taylor approximation is slightly modified. For
each year the certainty equivalent value of the expected utility is calculated and used in the
IRR calculation.
Two approaches are used in order to understand the effect of unemployment on the
IRR. In the first case expected earnings are used whereby expected earnings is got by
E[y] = piityit + (1− pi)b where pi is the probability of employment and b denotes unem-
3In 2009 the UK government increased the maximum amount of tuition fees to 3,290 pounds per year but
by 2012 the cap had been raised to 9,000 pounds. However this is just a maximum and it is possible that
some universities will charge less. In future work I will look at the effect of using different costs and allow for
borrowing while in college and fixed loan repayments throughout the working life in conjunction with the new
maintenance loans that are available to allow for a more complete analysis of the IRR.
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ployment benefit. I make no distinction between those who are unemployed and those who
are out of the labour force similar to Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2010). The unemployment
benefit used is the standard weekly benefit for a single adult in 2012. This benefit differs
depending on whether the individual is under 25 years of age or older and this is incorpo-
rated in to the analysis. Although the unemployment benefit is only given for a maximum
of 26 weeks (after which it is means tested against household income including housing
costs and household composition) for simplicity I assume that it is available for one year.
Since one period corresponds to one year this also assumes that individuals are unemployed
for the full year which may bias the results if the duration of unemployment varies by ed-
ucation. The second approach is to use the utility framework when analysing the effect
of unemployment. Although the probability of employment is increasing in education, the
replacement rate is significantly lower for the higher educated and this may be enough to
offset any gains since risk averse individuals dislike large fluctuations in their income. I
look at both approaches because only looking at unemployment risk in a utility set up may
lead to changes in returns that are due solely to the parametrization of the utility function
rather than the unemployment risk. The probability of employment is calculated from a
probit regression of employment on a set of covariates including a quadratic in age, year
dummies, dummies for parental education and a dummy denoting whether the individual is
white or not. This is performed separately for each education level and for each gender. For
robustness results I also examined the effects of using the mean value of employment and
there was very little change in the results.
2.3 Earnings Process
In the following earnings specification log net earnings are regressed on a quadratic in age,
year dummies, dummies for mother’s highest education level, father’s highest education
level and a dummy denoting whether the individual is white or not. I do not directly control
for cohort but by using year dummies and a linear age variable, I am in effect allowing
for a linear cohort trend. For robustest checks I include a quartic polynomial in cohort
but the results are very similar and so to increase the precision of my estimates I neglect
directly controlling for cohort. Unlike many studies which use the standard Mincer regres-
sion, I use a quadratic in age rather than experience. There are two reasons for doing this;
firstly experience is endogenous and secondly by controlling for experience the benefit to
leaving schooling early via the effect on increased labour market experience is eliminated.
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Conditioning on family background will pick up unobserved differences such as tastes and
possibly ability. The regression is performed separately by gender and by education level.
By estimating the regression separately by education level I allow all covariates to vary with
education. This is necessary since earnings growth rates are not parallel across schooling
levels.4. One reason for non-separability would be differential on the job investment, for
example, Mincer (1991) finds that the higher educated are more likely to receive training.5
Log earnings are defined as usual net monthly earnings multiplied by twelve. I decided to
use monthly earnings rather than annual earnings as the latter would be affected by periods
of unemployment throughout the year and thus when I am computing the unemployment
adjusted return, I would in effect be overestimating the effects of unemployment. Most pa-
pers use some measure of the gross wage as the dependent variable but with a progressive
tax system this is not suitable since the individual will only receive a certain proportion of
their income - that proportion decreasing with education - and therefore I use net earnings.
I do not include variables such as marital status, region or industry since these variables
can be considered as intermediate variables in that they may be outcomes themselves of the
education decision and thus by controlling for these variables, I would eliminate some of
the pathways through which higher returns to education are realised.
The error term consists of an individual fixed effect, a random walk and a purely tran-
sitory iid component. The transitory and permanent shocks are mean zero and serially
uncorrelated.
Yi,a,t = Xi,a,tβ + fi+ui,a,t + vi,a,t
The permanent component has a unit root such that
vi,a,t = vi,a−1,t−1+ζi,a,t
4Migali and Walker (2011) and Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) find evidence against separability
5Additionally, this set up is advantageous over earlier studies which included years of schooling as a dummy
variable in the regression and thus impose linearity in returns to schooling. The existence of“sheep skin effects”
whereby the returns to schooling vary with each qualification completed and therefore the returns to an extra
year of schooling which does not warrant a qualification will be less than a year of schooling which does are
captured by performing the regression separately by education level.
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Residual income is given by yi,,a,t = Yi,a,t −Xi,a,tβ = fi+ui,a,t + vi,a,t
Residual income growth is therefore gi,a,t = yi,a,t − yi,a−1,t−a = ζi,a+∆ui,a,t
Thus the variance of the permanent and transitory components can be identified by
Cov(gi,a,t ,gi,a,t−1+gi,a,t +gi,a,t+1) = var(ζi,a,t)
Cov(gi,a,t ,gi,a,t+1) =−var(ui,a,t)
This earnings specification assumes that measurement error in earnings is negligible or
subsumed by the transitory component. However, since I am only interested in comparing
the returns at two different education levels, this should not be a problem if there is no
systematic difference in measurement error across education levels. Bound and Krueger
(1994) find that measurement error is uncorrelated with education.6 I allow the variance to
differ across ages as it is likely that the variance of wages will change across the life cycle
due to an array of different reasons such as workers and firms gradually learning about
the individual’s productivity (Faber and Gobbons, 1997), differential investment in human
capital and the increased occurrence of health shocks at the end of the life cycle.
2.4 Selection Bias
There are two main channels by which the IRR estimates may be biased – endogenous em-
ployment and endogenous schooling. Individuals are not randomly assigned to education or
employment and therefore if there is non random selection in to either the estimates will be
biased. It is likely that those individuals who acquire additional education or who choose to
become employed may have higher ability or better non cognitive skills and thus it is erro-
neous to compare the earnings of individuals at two different education levels. In an ideal
set up, earnings would be obtained on the same individual for the two different education
6Additionally, if measurement error is constant over time then by using the growth of the residual, any
measurement error will be eliminated.
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levels and the subsequent earnings would be compared, however since the individual can
only choose one education stream to follow, it is necessary to somehow impute the earnings
she would have received had she chosen the alternate education path. This is analogous to a
Roy model (1958) where there are two states of the world but the individual can only choose
one. The unobserved earnings stream is what is known as the counterfactual. In this paper
I abstract from the issue of endogenous schooling but deal with endogenous employment.
In the following analysis identification of the correct counterfactual is achieved by using a
Heckman two step correction model which subject to some distributional assumptions al-
lows one to overcome the issue of selection bias. Although a control function approach is
less robust than other experimental estimators such as IV due to the strong distributional
assumptions that are required, the advantage is that by specifying the distribution of unob-
servables one can identify the Average Treatment Effect. Instrumental variables on the other
hand while more robust can only identify a local average treatment effect, that is, the affect
of treatment on the sub population induced in to treatment due to the instrument which may
not have any meaningful economic interpretation7.
2.5 Endogenous Labour Market Participation
Almost all studies examining the returns to schooling use current earnings as a proxy for
lifetime earnings. However, the use of current earnings will lead to inconsistent estimates
because earnings vary systematically over the life cycle. Workers with high lifetime earn-
ings tend to have higher earnings growth rates than workers with low lifetime earnings and
thus a comparison of earnings at the early stage of the life cycle will lead to a downward bias
while comparing individuals late in life will lead to an upward bias in the estimates. Any
attempt to overcome this problem by controlling for age or experience will not eliminate
this bias because the result is due to heterogeneous variation around the central tendency
of earnings growth (Haider and Solon, 2006). Bhuller, Mogstad and Salvanes (2011) us-
ing Norwegian data on males with almost career long earnings histories find substantial
evidence of a life-cycle bias in the returns to schooling. They find a strong positive rela-
tionship between the mean age in the sample and the returns to schooling and suggest that
in order to minimize bias, the sample should be restricted to individuals aged 32 to 33.
However, if there is differential selection in to employment at these ages there may still be
7The raising of the school leaving age (Harmon and Walker (1995)) is one instance where the identified
LATE may have particular policy relevance since it gives the effect of extra schooling for those who would
have left without the law but now acquire extra schooling as a result of the law.
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bias in the returns. They also only estimate the life-cycle bias for males so the bias may be
very different for females. Given that female earnings growth rates are not as large as males
one might expect any bias to be substantially smaller. However given the complexity of the
interaction between female labour supply, childbearing years and education it is hard to pin
point the direction of bias. If higher educated females have children at an older age then
comparing females at different stages of the life cycle would induce a child bearing bias
in addition to any life cycle bias. Therefore only by looking over the whole life cycle and
correcting for any endogeneity can one be certain to obtain the correct earnings differential.
When looking at the returns over the whole life cycle accounting for endogenous
employment decisions is crucial. Most studies looking at the return to education focus
on prime labour market participation ages when individuals are most likely to be in the
labour market to avoid dealing with this issue. There are substantial differences in labour
market participation over the life cycle, across education groups and in the interaction of
education and the life cycle. At younger ages it is likely that there is positive selection in
to the labour market for the low educated if those with the least labour market value are
hit with unemployment shocks. There may be negative selection for the higher educated
if those with high earnings capabilities undertake MBAs or PhDs. At the end of the life
cycle there is less attachment to the labour market for all education groups due to a variety
of reasons including early retirement, unemployment and the fact that at the end of the life
cycle the returns from investing in one’s human capital are diminished due to the small
amount of time left in the labour market to recoup the returns to experience (Shaw, 1989).
Towards the end of the life cycle it is possible that there is positive selection in the labour
market for the low educated if those who are hit with negative unemployment shocks or are
discouraged from their low growth rates leave the labour market while there may be positive
selection for the higher educated if those who have high earnings stay in the labour market
as the opportunity cost of leaving is too great. Conversely, there may be negative selection
for all education levels if better individuals who have amassed enough wealth retire early.
Obviously many different hypotheses can be put forward regarding the way selection into
the labour market works for each education level and for each gender; if there is positive
selection of low educated workers then comparing returns at two different levels (assuming
random selection in to employment of the higher educated) will lead to a downward bias in
returns to education; on the other hand it could be that the average high educated worker is
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of higher quality than a potential high educated worker and in this case (assuming random
selection in to the lower education level) returns will be overestimated. Correcting for non
random selection in to the labour market is very important if one wants to get an unbiased
estimate of the returns to education. In order to address this issue I use a Heckman selection
equation. To avoid identification coming exclusively from the non linearity of the inverse
mills ratio, I use annual non labour income net of annual means tested cash benefits as
an instrument for labour market participation. This is valid as long as non labour income
significantly affects the decision to work while having no affect on subsequent earnings.8





Pit = 1 if P∗it > 0
Pit = 0 otherwise










where εit is the unobserved component of the log wage equation and σ2pi has been
normalised to 1.
Then
E[yit |Pit = 1,x,z] = Xi,tβ +ρεpiλ (r′itθ)
Var[yit |Pit = 1,x,z] = σ2yi,t −ρ2εpiλ (r′itθ)(r′itθ +λ (r′itθ))






Correcting the variance of the permanent component is slightly more involved since
the permanent component is identified from the growth of residual earnings. Therefore
the permanent component is only identified if the individual is in the labour market for
two consecutive time periods. However, assuming that the permanent error component is
independent and serially uncorrelated across time periods then the variance of the permanent
component can be identified from the following equations:
E[git |Pit = 1,Pi,t−1,x,z] = ρζpiλ (r′itθ)
Var[git |Pit = 1,Pi,t−1 = 1,x,z] = σ2ζi,t +σ2ui,t +σ2ui,t−1 +ρ2ζpiλ (r′itθ)(r′itθ +λ (r′itθ))
σ2ui,t =−Cov(gi,a,t ,gi,a,t+1)
2.6 Data
The data I use is the first 18 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 9 The
BHPS started in 1991 and collected information on approximately 5,500 households and
10,300 individuals in England. Supplementary samples covering Scotland and Wales each
containing 1,500 households were added in 1999 while in 2001 some 2,000 households
representing Northern Ireland were added. The BHPS contains rich information on educa-
tion, income, family background, employment and consumption. In the analysis I drop self
employed individuals, those who are still in full time education and those who are older
than 65 or younger than seventeen. Those with missing information on usual net monthly
pay, highest education qualification, race, age or parental education are also dropped. The
education variable I use is a derived variable in the BHPS denoting highest academic qualifi-
cation. I group those with higher degree, first degree, HNC, HDC or teaching to the highest
9The BHPS in 2009 became part of the new Understanding Society Survey. This the largest longitudinal
survey of it’s kind in the UK sampling some 40,000 households.
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schooling level which I refer to as “College”, those with A-levels comprise the schooling
level which I refer to as “High School” and those with anything less than A-levels make up
the lowest schooling level. Each parental education variable is categorised into no qualifi-
cations/some qualifications/further education/university qualification and finally a variable
denoting whether an individual is white or not is derived. The bottom and top 1 percent
of earnings in each year are trimmed to eliminate any measurement error or outliers. All
imputed earnings are set to missing. Earnings and consumption are deflated to 1991 prices
using the UK retail price index (RPI).
2.7 Risk Differentials
There are quite substantial differences in employment levels across education groups and
over the life cycle for both males and females. For males, over the whole working life
those with less than high school have average employment levels of 72.1%, for those with
a high school degree it’s 79.3% while those with college are employed 83% of the time.
For females it’s 60%, 76% and 77% respectively. Thus employment levels are increasing in
education but with a larger difference between high school and less than high school degree
than between college and high school. The lack of full employment highlights the impor-
tance to correct for non-random selection into the labour market. Turning to the variance
of earnings where variance is got by taking the square of the residual from a regression of
log earnings on a set of explanatory variables, there appears to be a u-shaped pattern in ed-
ucation with the variance for less than high school being 0.1405, the variance for those with
a high school degree being 0.1404 while the variance of college graduates is 0.1439. Al-
though the difference is not large across education groups, it appears that college education
has the most risk.10 However once I correct for endogenous labour market participation the
results are very different. The lowest education group sees the largest rise with the variance
rising to 0.1807 which is not surprising given the low labour market attachment for this
group. The increase for the other two groups is a lot smaller; high school variance increases
to 0.159 and the variance of college graduates increases to 0.1568. For females the uncor-
10There is concern in the literature that the risk may be known to the individual in advance as they may know
their own ability, motivation and other skills. To get around this I look at the variance of the growth in the
residual which will eliminate the effect of any time invariant person specific effects on the variance. This leads
to a variance which is decreasing in education level: 0.0568, 0.0452, 0.044. Therefore it seems that a large part
of the risk in education is attributable to person heterogeneity which is fixed over time. However whether the
risk is known or unknown is still an empirical question that has not been convincingly answered in the literature
to date.
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rected variance is largest for the low educated and smallest for the higher educated while
the selection adjusted variance leads to a substantial increase in the variance of the college
graduates, a small increase for the low educated and virtually no change for the high school
graduates. This suggests that there is large positive or negative selection of college educated
females resulting in a distribution that is truncated at the lower tail or upper tail while the
unchanged variance for the high school graduates suggests that despite the less than full
employment, selection in to employment is random.
Next I decompose the variance in to permanent and transitory shocks. It is impor-
tant to distinguish between these two aspects since they have very different welfare effects.
Transitory shocks which are temporary and short lasting include a short illness, a bonus,
overtime labour supply and any mean reverting shock. It is argued that transitory shocks
average out over one’s lifetime or can be smoothed through savings and so do not effect wel-
fare, Cochrane (1991) and Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) find full insurance against
transitory shocks.11 Conversely, permanent shocks such as low productivity, disability, pro-
motion, and skill biased technological change are less likely to be insured against and have
persistent effects on a person’s earnings and welfare. For males the variance of the transi-
tory shock is decreasing in education; 0.0149 for those with less than high school, 0.0106
for those with a high school degree and 0.0069 for those with college. Thus it appears that
going to college will decrease the effects of transitory shocks which is what one would ex-
pect given that unemployment is decreasing in schooling level. The variance of transitory
shocks for females is u-shaped in education with the college educated having a variance of
transitory shocks equal to .023, high school graduates 0.012 and low educated 0.018. The
quite substantial difference between the two highest education levels is not due to higher
levels of unemployment given that they are very similar and so may be due to higher lev-
els of mobility between jobs or differences in variation on the intensive margin if higher
educated females are more likely to move in and out of part time employment.12
The variance of the permanent shocks for males is u-shaped in schooling level. For
those with less than high school it is 0.013, those with high school degree it is 0.0102 and
for those with college it is 0.0118. Correcting the variance of permanent shocks for partic-
11One way transitory shocks could affect welfare is if individuals faced liquidity constraints.
12It could also be due to the fact that higher educated individuals have children at older ages than their
lower educated counterparts and given that the distribution of earnings is more dispersed at these ages due to
differential growth rates the variance of transitory shocks will be larger. This is assuming that maternity leave
represents a temporary change in income and so that females do not stay out of the market for too long once
they give birth.
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ipation leads to increases for all education levels while maintaining the u-shaped pattern.
Therefore it appears that males who do not obtain a high school degree have higher risk in
terms of unemployment, higher transitory shocks and higher permanent shocks than those
with either a high school degree or college education. This suggests that accounting for
risk will substantially increase the returns to a high school degree. The variance of perma-
nent shocks for females is decreasing in education while correcting for employment leads
to increases at all levels with the largest increase being for the low educated which is not
surprising given their low employment rates. Therefore although college educated females
face larger short term risk, they face less volatility in uninsurable permanent shocks which
may lead to an increase in returns to education. It should be noted that these results which
use after tax earnings will differ from those using gross earnings leading to lower variance
of the permanent component but increasing the volatility of the transitory shocks because
now tax changes become an additional source of uncertainty.
2.8 Results
2.8.1 Males
First I look at the IRR without unemployment risk or wage risk. In this set up individuals
receive expected earnings over the whole lifetime. This leads to an IRR of 6.3% to college
and 7.32% to high school. 13. Adjusting for unemployment risk but still assuming agents
are risk neutral increases the return to college to 7.32% and to high school graduates to
10.72%. Allowing for risk aversion and assuming a coefficient of relative risk aversion
equal to 1.5 (Attanasio and Weber (1995)) the unemployment adjusted return to college is
8.5% while it’s 13.16% for high school graduates. Thus as expected the lower probability
of unemployment for those with higher education leads to a higher return to schooling.
Focusing on wage risk now and still assuming a coefficient of risk aversion equal to 1.5 and
using the variance of the residual as a measure of wage risk, the adjusted return to college
is 6.17% while the adjusted IRR for high school graduates is 8.25%. Thus the inclusion
of wage risk decreases the returns to college due to the higher risk relative to high school
graduates while the return to high school is increased due to the higher risk of those with
13This result is consistent with returns found in the literature, for example, Grenet (2009) uses the raising of
the school leaving age in Britain and finds an extra year of schooling increases hourly wages by 6 to 7% and
Ashenfelter et al (2000) find that studies investigating the return to an extra year of schooling, on average, find
a return of 6.6%. The similarity of the results suggests that neither endogeneity nor sheepskin effects may be
an issue in estimating returns.
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less than high school degree although the change is not very substantial: 0.15% and 0.25%
respectively. Using the variance of the permanent shocks instead of the residual to denote
risk the wage risk adjusted return to college is 6.26% while it is 8% for high school. Thus
using the permanent shock dampens any wage risk adjustment in returns. This is due to the
fact that transitory shocks are decreasing in education and it is the transitory shocks that are
driving the results with a more modest differential in permanent shocks leading to returns
that are not so much affected. Although the returns to college are lower when adjustment is
made for wage risk due to the higher risk involved, Weisbrod (1962) stresses that the extra
risk may not be considered as decreasing utility if going to college increases the potential
occupations available to the individual. Looking at the combined effect of both wage risk
and unemployment risk results in returns that are similar to the unemployment adjusted
return. This is due to the fact that the effect of unemployment risk is quite large while the
effect of wage risk is negligible.
Next, I examine the effect of increasing the degree of relative risk aversion. Assuming
a coefficient of risk aversion of 3 leads to a drop of approximately 1.4% and 1% (in abso-
lute value) to the returns to both college and high school respectively. As the probability
of employment is increasing in education this is surprising as one would expect those with
higher levels of risk aversion to favour education levels with lower unemployment risk. The
increase in the RRA leads to a slight reduction in the wage risk adjusted return to college
and a slight increase in the wage risk adjusted return to high school. The increase in the
coefficient of relative risk aversion places more weight on the reduction of risk and less
weight on higher income due to the concavity of the utility function. Since having a high
school degree has less wage risk the IRR to college falls while the IRR to high school rises
but interestingly the increase in degree of risk aversion leads to a decrease in the unemploy-
ment adjusted IRR to both schooling levels with the biggest decrease occurring for those
with college. This is due to the set up of the UK benefit system. The UK has one of the
lowest replacement rates in the OECD.14 Since the unemployment benefit is independent
of predisplacement earnings, the higher educated lose a higher fraction of income when
unemployed 15. This flat benefit system results in large swings in earnings. Thus although
college graduates face a lower probability of unemployment, the large decline in earnings
14The UK ranks low amongst OECD countries with a replacement rate of under 20% compared with replace-
ment rates of over 60% for countries such as Sweden and Portugal.
15Although not modelled here, higher educated lose most when unemployed not only due to lower replace-
ment rates but they also have higher human capital depreciation rates and forego large gains to work experience.
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on becoming unemployed makes it less valuable when an individual is averse to large de-
viations in earnings. In contrast, those with low education face smaller relative declines in
earnings when they become unemployed. However this model abstracts from the value of
leisure which may play a small part in alleviating the negative impacts of unemployment. If
consumption and leisure are substitutes then the negative income effects of unemployment
may be offset by the utility from increased leisure.
Turning to the results from the control function approach which correct for endogenous
employment. The first stage results show that the non labour income net of benefits has a
significant negative effect on employment at all education levels. While the inclusion of
the inverse mills ratio in the regression suggests that workers are negatively selected in
to employment at all education levels. This result could be due to negative selection in
older ages outweighing positive selection at other stages of the life cycle. 16 Correcting
for endogenous labour market participation leads to a fall in the IRR to college and high
school with the IRR to college now being 5.81% and the IRR to high school being 5.79%.
The unemployment adjusted return is similar to the baseline case without the employment
correction with the effect of unemployment risk increasing the IRR at all levels but with
a small decrease when the degree of risk aversion is increased. The wage risk adjusted
IRR is now different than the baseline case increasing returns to both college and high
school. The wage risk adjusted return increases the return to high school by almost 2% while
slightly increasing the returns to college. This difference in the wage risk adjusted return
is because the degree of employment truncation is higher for those with lower education.
This highlights the importance of accounting for selection in employment as without this
correction it would appear that wage risk lowers the IRR to college while having little
effect on high school returns. Increasing the coefficient of relative risk aversion to 3 leads
the wage risk adjusted return to increase for both college and high school although the
increase is not very large. Similar to the baseline case, using permanent shocks dampens
the impact of wage risk for all levels of education. Finally, accounting for both wage risk
and unemployment risk results in returns which are similar to the unemployment adjusted
return.
16Interacting the inverse mills ratio with age and adding a quadratic in this interaction term shows the higher
educated select positively in to the labour market but the estimate is not significant and adjusting the mean
and variance for the additional selection terms leads to unreasonable results and so I decide to use the standard
approach and only include the inverse mills ratio in the regression.
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2.8.2 Females
The uncorrected IRR for females is similar to that for males with the return to high school
being slightly larger than the return to college: 7.06% for college and 9.85% for high school.
Given that males are more likely to be unemployed due to job destruction or failure to find
a job, the same cannot be said for females. Many females choose not to work for a variety
of reasons and so it would be incorrect to refer to non-employment as ”unemployment risk”
since it may be a choice. Therefore when talking about females, rather than calling it the
unemployment adjusted return I will denote it as the return after correcting for periods of
non-employment. This adjustment leads to a drop in the IRR to college of approximately
2.5% while the return to high school almost doubles to 16.6%. This is due to the low
employment levels of low educated females. Looking at wage risk lowers the IRR to college
by approximately 0.5% while increasing the IRR to high school by almost 3% signifying
the u-shaped pattern in the variance across education levels. When only permanent shocks
are used as a source of wage risk the adjusted return to college is now slightly larger than
the baseline case while the return to high school is slightly lower and almost 3% lower than
the wage risk adjusted return that uses the variance. This is in contrast to the findings for
males whereby using both the variance and the variance of the permanent shocks resulted in
changes in the same direction. Looking at both the unemployment and wage risk adjusted
returns leads to estimates that are similar in magnitude to the unemployment adjusted return.
Increasing the degree of risk aversion to 3 leads to a negative IRR to college of -0.4%
while the IRR to high school is still larger than the baseline case but significantly less than
the return correcting for periods of non-employment when the degree of risk aversion is 1.5.
This highlights that returns to education are heterogeneous in the degree of risk aversion.
Those with extremely large levels of risk aversion may be put off from college by the large
swings in potential earnings due to the low replacement rates. The wage risk adjusted return
now falls slightly for college and rises slightly for high school. Increasing the degree of risk
aversion has large effects on the unemployment adjusted return but the effect on wage risk
is fairly innocuous. The low return to college when unemployment risk is included suggests
that given the likelihood that females may drop out of the labour market once they start
a family and given that labour supply is the channel by which returns to human capital
investment are reaped, it may seem that investing in college for females may not be such a
worthwhile pursuit. However, if by going to college females marry college educated men
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this will tend to increase the overall returns.
Correcting for participation leads the return to college to more than double to 14.5%
while the return to high school falls to 6.2%. The large increase in the return to college is
consistent with the hypothesis that the lower educated select positively in to employment
although the coefficient on the inverse mills ratio is negative suggesting negative selection
in to employment at all education levels.17 If those college educated women who would
earn the most if they participate in the labour market are married to high earning men and
due to high levels of wealth decide not to participate in the labour market then selection
adjusted returns will be larger. Increasing the degree of risk aversion leads to similar results
to the baseline case. Overall it appears that correcting for selection in to employment is
particularly large for females leading to substantial changes in the rate of return. Unem-
ployment risk decreases the IRR to college while significantly increasing the IRR to high
school; wage risk decreases the returns to college while increasing the returns to high school
but using only uninsurable risk as represented by the permanent shocks counteracts these
effects resulting in a wage risk adjusted return that is similar to the unadjusted return.
2.9 Advanced Information and Insurance
There is a huge debate about whether the variance observed by the econometrician repre-
sents risk from the agent’s point of view. Recent studies by Heckman, Cunha and Navarro
(2005) find that individuals know at least 40 percent of the risk due to heterogeneity and
therefore neglecting this insight will lead to an overestimate of risk. They estimate the cor-
relation between observed outcomes and the agent’s schooling decision to infer the amount
of risk that is known in advance. This could be due to individual’s knowing their own abil-
ity, motivation etc. Since in my analysis I used the variance of the permanent shocks as a
measure of risk which uses the residual growth rate, this will eliminate any fixed unobserved
factors such as ability that may be known to the individual. However it is possible that there
are time varying factors such as promotion or demotion that may be known in advance to the
individual. It is possible to test for advanced information if one has data on consumption. In
the BHPS there is data for each year on usual weekly food expenditure. 18 While it would
be better to have consumption items such as expenditure on clothing, travel, and other non
durables, due to a lack of data covering these items, previous studies have also used food
17The first stage results show that the instrument has negative effects on employment at all education levels.
18This includes takeaways but excludes meals eaten in restaurants.
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expenditure, for example, Zeldes (1989). The permanent income hypothesis predicts that
consumption should only react to unanticipated permanent income shocks as it is assumed
that agents can perfectly insure themselves against transitory shocks via savings.19 It is
likely that if one expects a promotion at the end of the term then this will be factored in to
consumption decisions from today and although from the econometricians point of view it
registers as a shock when the agent gets promoted, this will not be a shock to the agent. Fol-
lowing Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) I test for evidence of superior information.
The basic idea is that if income is anticipated by the agent then future income growth should
be correlated with current consumption growth. If there is a significant correlation between
current consumption growth and future income growth then this implies that the agent has
more information and such shocks that appear as risk may in fact be already known to the
individual. I regress the real values of log consumption and log earnings on a wide set of
covariates including dummies for year of birth, year, household size, job status, number of
children, region, marital status and race separately for each gender and education level and
use the residuals from these regressions in the test. Tables 1 and 2 shows that for those with
college the test of no correlation between current consumption growth and future income
growth is rejected for both males and females.
Table 2.1: Males: P-values for test of null hypotheses of no correlation between consumption
growth and future income growth for all years
Less than HS High School College
Test Cov(∆yi,t+1,∆ci,t) = 0 for all t 0.197 0.286 0.112
Test Cov(∆yi,t+2,∆ci,t) = 0 for all t 0.202 0.745 0.921
Test Cov(∆yi,t+3,∆ci,t) = 0 for all t 0.593 0.502 0.604
Test Cov(∆yi,t+4,∆ci,t) = 0 for all t 0.694 0.747 0.669
Table 2.2: Females: P-values for test of null hypotheses of no correlation between consumption
growth and future income growth for all years
Less than HS High School College
Test Cov(∆yi,t+1,∆ci,t) = 0 for all t 0.456 0.996 0.268
Test Cov(∆yi,t+2,∆ci,t) = 0 for all t 0.091 0.853 0.219
Test Cov(∆yi,t+3,∆ci,t) = 0 for all t 0.607 0.070 0.413
Test Cov(∆yi,t+4,∆ci,t) = 0 for all t 0.111 0.642 0.878
19However observing a muted response of consumption to permanent shocks to income could be due to
advanced information or insurance. Van Rens and Primiceri (2009) attribute any observed change in permanent
shocks which do not translate in to consumption changes as information that must have been known in advance.
However this assumes that there is no insurance available for permanent shocks.
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On the other hand if there are mechanisms available that provide insurance against in-
come shocks this will help to alleviate the negative impact of the shocks. The availability of
insurance may differ across education levels and this will affect the internal rate of return.
Possible insurance mechanisms include savings, borrowing, spousal labour supply, social
networks and government transfers. It is likely that higher educated individuals would ben-
efit most from the savings and borrowing channel since their high earnings mean they can
afford to build up a buffer stock of precautionary savings to insure against adverse shocks
while also making them more attractive from a lender’s view point and furthermore it is
likely they have better credit history compared to the low educated who are more likely to
default on loans. There is large evidence that spousal labour supply can act as an insurance
mechanism, for example, Shelly Lundberg (1985) finds evidence that wife’s labour supply
increases in response to husband’s negative income shocks, Devereux (2003) finds that a 10
percent fall in husband’s wage leads to a 4% increase in wife’s hours of work while Blun-
dell, Pistaferri and Saporta-Ecksten (2012) find a 10% decrease in male wages leads to only
a 4.4% decrease in household consumption due to an increase in spouse’s labour supply.
While this may differ across education levels, assortative mating (Neal, 2004) would imply
that a higher educated spouse would command a higher wage and be more likely to get a job
than a lower educated spouse. Similarly, if those who attend college have a social network
which includes individuals who have also attended college then it is more likely that this
channel would provide some benefit. The role of government transfers is the most important
and widely available avenue for providing insurance to individuals through unemployment
insurance, disability benefits, etc. To the extent that government transfers are means tested
the lower educated will benefit the most from this insurance channel. Blundell, Graber and
Mogstad (2012) using Norwegian data find that taxes and transfers play a substantial role
in sheltering individuals from the adverse consequences of income shocks with particular
benefit for the low educated.
2.10 Conclusion
The majority of studies investigating the return to education do not adjust returns to account
for employment or wage risk which is equivalent to assuming that risk is constant across
education levels. This paper has provided evidence that there are significant differences in
employment probabilities and wage risk across education levels and that failure to account
for these differences in estimating the return to education will lead to substantially biased
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estimates. The main finding is that for males the returns to both high school and college
increase substantially once unemployment risk is taken in to account. Correcting for en-
dogenous employment decisions results in significant changes in the results highlighting
the need for studies investigating the returns to education to correct for non random selec-
tion in to employment. Overall, the results suggest that accounting for risk leads to large
changes in returns via employment risk while the wage risk adjusted returns are not as sub-
stantial. It is imperative that future studies investigating the returns to education take into
consideration the effects of risk and also endogenous employment decisions.
The results in this paper only focus on monetary returns but it is conceivable that the
non pecuniary returns are quite large. There is strong evidence that increased education
lowers crime, reduces the incidence of teenage birth, increases health and happiness and
leads to better decision making (see Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011) and the references
therein). Thus incorporating these non-monetary returns may lead to quite different results.
Of course this paper has not accounted for the endogeneity of education. Finding a credible
instrument for schooling is quite difficult but a must if one wants te be sure that the results
represent the casual effect of schooling and therefore future work will attempt to correct
for this endogeneity. Furthermore, the selection corrected results rely on the assumption
that the error terms determining the earnings and employment are jointly normal. Further
work relaxing this assumption is warranted. Das, Newey and Vella (2003) have used non
parametric selection models to investigate the returns to schooling. Lastly, the use of a
structural dynamic model may lead to insight in to the dynamics of unemployment risk and
wage risk over the life cycle and how the effect of differential experience accumulation and
human capital depreciation which vary by education level may affect the returns.
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Table 2.3: Males: OLS Regression of Log Annual Net Earnings
Low Education High School College
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0816∗∗∗ 0.0877∗∗∗ 0.0942∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0068) (0.0080)
Age Squared -0.0947∗∗∗ -0.1002∗∗∗ -0.1070∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0087) (0.0097)
Mother Some Quals 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0784∗∗ -0.0197
(0.0214) (0.0330) (0.0272)
Mother Further Education 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.0564 -0.0217
(0.0236) (0.0390) (0.0393)
Mother University 0.1386∗∗∗ -0.0196 -0.0103
(0.0487) (0.0593) (0.0517)
Father Some Quals 0.0054 0.0607∗ 0.0673∗∗
(0.0223) (0.0364) (0.0317)
Father Further Education 0.0174 0.0480 -0.0126
(0.0205) (0.0331) (0.0290)
Father University 0.0567 0.1574∗∗∗ 0.0593
(0.0408) (0.0517) (0.0453)
White 0.0453 0.0444 0.0732
(0.0470) (0.0995) (0.0624)
Observations 18270 7406 7983
N clust 2346 850 895
Standard Errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include year dummies.
(d) denotes dummy variable. The base category for White is Non-White.
The base category for parental education is No Qualifications.
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Table 2.4: Males: First Stage Estimates Probit of Employment using Non Labour Income as an
instrument
Low Education High School College
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0488∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0039)
Age Squared -0.0649∗∗∗ -0.0411∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0045)
Mother Some Quals (d) 0.0231 0.0398∗ 0.0188
(0.0229) (0.0207) (0.0116)
Mother Further Education (d) 0.0024 0.0366∗∗ -0.0057
(0.0332) (0.0176) (0.0191)
Mother University (d) -0.0758 0.0355 0.0031
(0.0574) (0.0257) (0.0306)
Father Some Quals (d) 0.0166 -0.0058 0.0176
(0.0227) (0.0270) (0.0132)
Father Further Education (d) -0.0027 -0.0348 0.0191
(0.0248) (0.0214) (0.0122)
Father University (d) 0.0670∗∗ -0.0743 0.0128
(0.0284) (0.0605) (0.0200)
White (d) 0.0649 -0.0679∗∗∗ -0.0444∗∗∗
(0.0551) (0.0114) (0.0099)
Non-Labour Income -0.0508∗∗∗ -0.0302∗∗∗ -0.0290∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0031)
Observations 9748 4772 6001
N clust 1984 739 897
Standard Errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include year dummies.
(d) denotes dummy variable. The base category for White is Non-White.
The base category for parental education is No Qualifications.
Non labour income refers to annual non labour income excluding benefits.
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Table 2.5: Males: Including Inverse Mills Ratio in OLS Regression of Log Annual Net Earnings
Low Education High School College
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0736∗∗∗ 0.0724∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0125) (0.0112)
Age Squared -0.0807∗∗∗ -0.0812∗∗∗ -0.0763∗∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0161) (0.0140)
Mother Some Quals 0.0525 0.0334 -0.0180
(0.0329) (0.0495) (0.0304)
Mother Further Education 0.0512 0.0147 -0.0610
(0.0355) (0.0507) (0.0461)
Mother University 0.1550∗ -0.1270 -0.0566
(0.0796) (0.0846) (0.0566)
Father Some Quals 0.0128 0.0843∗ 0.0353
(0.0329) (0.0497) (0.0338)
Father Further Education 0.0376 0.0415 -0.0605∗
(0.0267) (0.0472) (0.0344)
Father University 0.0508 0.2302∗∗∗ 0.0590
(0.0618) (0.0770) (0.0518)
White 0.0407 0.0235 0.0356
(0.0685) (0.1304) (0.0684)
Inverse Mills Ratio Low -0.3464∗∗∗
(0.0727)
Inverse Mills Ratio HS -0.2354∗
(0.1275)
Inverse Mills Ratio College -0.2532∗∗
(0.1106)
Observations 7157 3815 4833
N clust 1537 625 771
SEs in parentheses are computed using block bootstrap method.
Based on 500 replications and used to a/c for the pre-estimated IVM ratio.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include year dummies.
(d) denotes dummy variable. The base category for White is Non-White.
The base category for parental education is No Qualifications.
Non labour income refers to annual non labour income excluding benefits.
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Table 2.6: Males: Probit Regression of Employment
Low Education High School College
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0410∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0036)
Age Squared -0.0582∗∗∗ -0.0502∗∗∗ -0.0491∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Mother Some Quals (d) 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗ 0.0135
(0.0179) (0.0233) (0.0145)
Mother Further Education (d) 0.0456∗∗ 0.0334 -0.0043
(0.0223) (0.0229) (0.0184)
Mother University (d) 0.0426 0.0653∗∗∗ -0.0214
(0.0393) (0.0247) (0.0343)
Father Some Quals (d) 0.0266 -0.0351 0.0074
(0.0206) (0.0340) (0.0170)
Father Further Education (d) 0.0199 -0.0421∗ 0.0197
(0.0185) (0.0242) (0.0130)
Father University (d) 0.0595∗ -0.0551 0.0135
(0.0360) (0.0441) (0.0209)
White (d) 0.0673 -0.0455 0.0451
(0.0418) (0.0302) (0.0478)
Observations 26728 9702 10178
N clust 3035 994 1040
Standard Errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include year dummies.
(d) denotes dummy variable. The base category for White is Non-White.
The base category for parental education is No Qualifications.
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Table 2.7: Females: OLS Regression of Log Annual Net Earnings
Low Education High School College
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0487∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0102) (0.0111)
Age Squared -0.0429∗∗∗ -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0587∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0135) (0.0141)
Mother Some Quals 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0580 0.0219
(0.0264) (0.0455) (0.0437)
Mother Further Education 0.1111∗∗∗ 0.1856∗∗∗ 0.0132
(0.0309) (0.0495) (0.0478)
Mother University 0.3232∗∗∗ 0.1976∗∗∗ -0.0690
(0.0540) (0.0750) (0.0686)
Father Some Quals 0.0405 -0.0024 -0.0683
(0.0292) (0.0556) (0.0482)
Father Further Education 0.0589∗∗ -0.0590 -0.0164
(0.0256) (0.0439) (0.0446)
Father University 0.0440 0.0436 -0.1045
(0.0542) (0.0698) (0.0648)
White -0.1650∗∗∗ -0.0705 0.0117
(0.0615) (0.1284) (0.0899)
Observations 24201 6577 7505
N clust 3092 823 923
Standard Errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include year dummies.
(d) denotes dummy variable. The base category for White is Non-White.
The base category for parental education is No Qualifications.
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Table 2.8: Females: First Stage Estimates Probit of Employment using Non Labour Income as an
instrument
Low Education High School College
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0445∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0066)
Age Squared -0.0755∗∗∗ -0.0417∗∗∗ -0.0590∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0073) (0.0075)
Mother Some Quals (d) 0.0387 0.0093 0.0635∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0327) (0.0298)
Mother Further Education (d) 0.0558∗∗ 0.0314 0.0396
(0.0283) (0.0326) (0.0307)
Mother University (d) 0.0957∗ 0.0163 0.0932∗∗
(0.0529) (0.0488) (0.0376)
Father Some Quals (d) -0.0018 -0.0344 -0.0241
(0.0312) (0.0389) (0.0406)
Father Further Education (d) -0.0179 -0.0133 0.0036
(0.0235) (0.0325) (0.0319)
Father University (d) -0.0274 -0.0038 -0.0382
(0.0502) (0.0421) (0.0479)
White (d) 0.1311∗∗ 0.0535 0.0990
(0.0612) (0.0913) (0.1186)
Non-Labour Income -0.0417∗∗∗ -0.0373∗∗∗ -0.0406∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0060) (0.0058)
Observations 15382 4155 5723
N clust 2822 705 886
Standard Errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include year dummies.
(d) denotes dummy variable. The base category for White is Non-White.
The base category for parental education is No Qualifications.
Non labour income refers to annual non labour income excluding benefits.
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Table 2.9: Females: Including Inverse Mills Ratio in OLS Regression of Log Annual Net Earnings
Low Education High School College
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0736∗∗∗ 0.0724∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0119) (0.0112)
Age Squared -0.0807∗∗∗ -0.0812∗∗∗ -0.0763∗∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0152) (0.0139)
Mother Some Quals 0.0525∗ 0.0334 -0.0180
(0.0303) (0.0463) (0.0294)
Mother Further Education 0.0512 0.0147 -0.0610
(0.0340) (0.0547) (0.0463)
Mother University 0.1550∗∗ -0.1270 -0.0566
(0.0750) (0.0867) (0.0586)
Father Some Quals 0.0128 0.0843∗ 0.0353
(0.0344) (0.0497) (0.0343)
Father Further Education 0.0376 0.0415 -0.0605∗
(0.0270) (0.0455) (0.0356)
Father University 0.0508 0.2302∗∗∗ 0.0590
(0.0564) (0.0774) (0.0529)
White 0.0407 0.0235 0.0356
(0.0677) (0.1385) (0.0665)
Inverse Mills Ratio Low -0.3464∗∗∗
(0.0768)
Inverse Mills Ratio HS -0.2354∗
(0.1278)
Inverse Mills Ratio College -0.2532∗∗
(0.1131)
Observations 7157 3815 4833
N clust 1537 625 771
SEs in parentheses are computed using block bootstrap method.
Based on 500 replications and used to a/c for the pre-estimated IVM ratio.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include year dummies.
(d) denotes dummy variable. The base category for White is Non-White.
The base category for parental education is No Qualifications.
Non labour income refers to annual non labour income excluding benefits.
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Table 2.10: Females: Probit regression of Employment
Low Education High School College
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0052) (0.0054)
Age Squared -0.0631∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗ -0.0679∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0063) (0.0062)
Mother Some Quals (d) 0.0768∗∗∗ 0.0243 0.0484∗
(0.0177) (0.0277) (0.0264)
Mother Further Education (d) 0.0955∗∗∗ 0.0335 0.0252
(0.0204) (0.0289) (0.0273)
Mother University (d) 0.1208∗∗∗ 0.0376 -0.0118
(0.0413) (0.0388) (0.0410)
Father Some Quals (d) 0.0276 0.0270 -0.0159
(0.0208) (0.0307) (0.0335)
Father Further Education (d) 0.0134 0.0348 0.0107
(0.0170) (0.0262) (0.0275)
Father University (d) 0.0151 0.0350 -0.0086
(0.0375) (0.0357) (0.0371)
White (d) 0.1678∗∗∗ 0.0842 0.0611
(0.0432) (0.0816) (0.0794)
Observations 42208 9210 10664
N clust 4187 946 1081
Standard Errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Regressions include year dummies.
(d) denotes dummy variable. The base category for White is Non-White.
The base category for parental education is No Qualifications.
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Table 2.11: IRR
No Risk Expected Pay
College 0.063 0.0732
High School 0.0789 0.1072
Table 2.12: IRR with CRRA equal 1.5
Unemployment Risk WR (res) Both (res) WR (perm) Both (perm)
College 0.0850 0.0617 0.08164 0.0626 0.0844
High School 0.1316 0.0825 0.1306 0.08 0.1320
Table 2.13: IRR with CRRA equal 3
Unemployment Risk WR (res) Both (res) WR (perm) Both (perm)
College 0.0711 0.0609 0.0669 0.0621 0.0705
High School 0.1208 0.0832 0.1173 0.0811 0.1208
Note: The term in parentheses denotes which measure of wage risk was used in calcu-
lating the estimates. res denotes the variance of the residual and perm denotes the variance
of permanent shocks.
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Table 2.14: IRR Corrected for Endogenous Employment
No Risk Expected Pay
College 0.0581 0.0677
High School 0.0579 0.092
Table 2.15: IRR Corrected for Endogenous Employment CRRA equal 1.5
Unemployment Risk WR (res) Both (res) WR (perm) Both (perm)
College 0.0804 0.0598 0.0792 0.0586 0.0805
High School 0.1232 0.0762 0.1306 0.0658 0.1284
Table 2.16: IRR Corrected for Endogenous Employment CRRA equal 3
Unemployment Risk WR (res) Both (res) WR (perm) Both (perm)
College 0.0661 0.0603 0.0579 0.0588 0.0657
High School 0.1169 0.0815 0.1163 0.0718 0.1183
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Table 2.17: IRR Females
No Risk Expected Pay
College 0.0706 0.0656
High School 0.0985 0.1651
Table 2.18: IRR with CRRA equal 1.5
Periods of Non-Employment WR (res) Both (res) WR (perm) Both (perm)
College 0.0449 0.0669 0.0425 0.0718 0.0457
High School 0.1873 0.1258 0.1903 0.0982 0.1853
Table 2.19: IRR with CRRA equal 3
Periods of Non-Employment WR (res) Both (res) WR (perm) Both (perm)
College -0.004 0.0653 0.0024 .0.0729 -0.0029
High School 0.1285 0.1308 0.1293 0.0979 0.1275
2.12. Appendix 50
Table 2.20: IRR Females Corrected for Endogenous Employment
No Risk Expected Pay
College 0.1448 0.1310
High School 0.0617 0.1214
Table 2.21: IRR Females Corrected for Endogenous Employment CRRA equal 1.5
Periods of Non-Employment WR (res) Both (res) WR (perm) Both (perm)
College 0.0821 0.1016 0.0579 0.1510 0.0867
High School 0.1629 0.0973 0.17 0.1766 0.1668
Table 2.22: IRR Corrected for Endogenous Employment CRRA equal 3
Periods of Non-Employment WR (res) Both (res) WR (perm) Both (perm)
College 0.0003 0.095 0.0038 0.1559 0.11
High School 0.1209 0.098 0.1191 0.088 0.1252
Chapter 3
Education, Uncertainty and Business Cycles
*This is joint work with Paul J Devereux (University College Dublin)
3.1 Introduction
Earnings volatility is a feature of modern labour markets as individual workers are
subject to wage and employment variation. In the absence of full insurance against
labour market adversities, volatility can have large effects on the welfare of individ-
uals (Low et al (2010), Heathcote et al. (2014), French (2005), Banks et al (2001),
Blundell et al (2008)). These issues are especially pertinent in times of recession
when employers faced with rising costs and falling demand seek to cut costs by
either firing workers and/or implementing wage cuts. Can investments in education
provide shelter against these economic uncertainties? And do policies that increase
educational attainment, such as compulsory schooling laws, reduce the earnings
volatility faced by workers? These questions are important given the recent great
recession which had large negative effects on many individuals.
While some research has studied the relationship between education and earn-
ings volatility, there is no general consensus. 1 Moreover, these estimates represent
correlations rather than the causal effect of education on earnings volatility. Per-
sons with more education may have higher ability and differ in other unobservable
ways that lead them to have less or more earnings volatility independent of their
1Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) using the PSID find a u-shaped pattern with high school graduates having
lower earnings volatility than high school dropouts but higher than college graduates, while Blundell et al (2015)
using Norwegian data find that the interaction of earnings volatility and the life cycle differs by education.
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educational attainment.
There is very little evidence about the causal effects of education on earnings
volatility. While it is not the central focus of her paper, Chen (2008) uses U.S.
data to estimate the transitory component of earnings using a parametric selection
model. Contemporaneous to our research, Liu et al. (2015) use compulsory school-
ing changes in Norway to estimate the transitory component of earnings for indi-
viduals with low levels of education. Our focus is different in that we study direct
measures of earnings volatility experienced by individuals including the standard
deviation of individual earnings, the cyclicality of earnings, and the probability of a
pay cut. In fact, to our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the direct causal
effect of education on these particular measures. Additionally, we contribute to the
literature by studying a highly cyclical labour market up to and including the great
recession.
Our analysis uses a regression discontinuity design based on a change in com-
pulsory schooling combined with a large panel dataset. We find that an additional
year of education leads to a reduced standard deviation of log earnings of about
0.01 (around 10% of the mean standard deviation), decreased probability of re-
ceiving a pay cut of about 3.5 percentage points and to a lower level of earnings
cyclicality. These results are robust to many specifications. A recent survey paper
highlights that education leads to large benefits in terms of wages, health, employ-
ment, voting behaviour, crime, teenage pregnancy, decision making and in many
other dimensions (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011); we show an additional channel
through which education may lead to welfare gains for individuals – lower earnings
volatility.
There are many reasons to expect that earnings volatility may be influenced
by education level. Education may affect the industry or occupation chosen by the
individual and, thus, may affect the labour market shocks to which they are ex-
posed. For example, more educated individuals may work in less volatile industries
such as services rather than manufacturing or construction. When searching for
jobs, more educated workers may be more effective (have greater search capital)
and may achieve better job matches with lower subsequent wage volatility and a
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lower likelihood of layoff (Mincer 1991). More educated workers are likely to be
more mobile geographically and hence able to move region in order to reduce the
effects of local shocks (Machin et al 2012). Firms may be less likely to lay off more
educated workers if hiring and vacancy costs are greater for them. Finally, more ed-
ucated workers may be quicker to adapt to technological advances and/or have skills
which are complementary to technology, and so may retain their jobs and have in-
creased wage growth in times of structural change within the economy. While these
factors tend to imply lower earnings volatility for more educated workers, there are
other factors that suggest the opposite. More education typically comes with the
likelihood of greater specialisation that may make the worker more exposed to spe-
cific shocks. Moreover, since the more educated typically have higher wages, they
can more easily absorb wage cuts as opposed to low wage workers. The presence of
the minimum wage may also lead to less volatility for those with lower education
since it provides a lower bound on wages. As such, whether or not greater education
lowers earnings volatility is an empirical question which we attempt to answer in
this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the data, section 3 describes
the measures of earnings volatility that we study, section 4 describes the estimation
strategy, section 5 contains the results, and section 6 does some robustness checks.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
3.2 Data
The New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) is a large administrative dataset
covering the period 1975 to 2013. It follows a random sample of 1% of the British
population whose national insurance number ends in a certain pair of digits. The
survey refers to a specific week in April each year and excludes the self employed.
Due to the fact that the survey uses national insurance numbers, the attrition rate is
very low since if an individual temporarily drops out of the labour market, becomes
unemployed or changes job, they will be picked up again once they begin working.
The main advantage of the dataset, apart from the large sample sizes, is that the data
are very accurate. Employers are obliged by law to fill out the employee information
and thus there is less measurement error or non-response than is typically the case
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in household surveys. 2 Also, the long period of time covered by the dataset makes
it ideal for estimating cyclical effects. The data span the recessions of the early 80s,
early 90s and the recent ‘Great Recession’.
Our measure of earnings is the log of weekly pay including overtime. Because
of the difficult issues involved with dealing with non-participation of women in the
labour market, we focus our analysis on males. We exclude those individuals whose
pay was affected by absence and limit the sample to those aged between 20 and 60
to reduce selection effects that typically occur at the beginning and end of the life
cycle. 3 Because the compulsory schooling law changed for the 1957 cohort, we
only include those born between 1947 and 1967 and, in our primary analysis, we
study cohorts born between 1952 and 1962.
For survey years prior to 2004, the age variable in the survey refers to age as
at January 1st. Therefore we calculate year of birth as year - age - 1. From 2004
onwards the age variable refers to age as at the time of survey which implies that
assigning year of birth to be equal to year - age - 1 will only be correct roughly two
thirds of the time. We contacted the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) who
kindly provided us with the actual year of birth of individuals from 2004 onwards.
Since the first persons affected by the law change were born in September 1957,
this implies that our 1957 cohort includes both treated and untreated individuals.
Therefore, we drop this cohort in all our analyses. We do know, however, that all
persons in our 1956 cohort were untreated and all persons in our 1958 cohort were
treated.4
Persons born in 1962 are recorded as aged 20 in the 1983 survey year. 1983 is,
therefore, the first survey year in which all persons born between 1952 and 1962 are
potentially in our sample. Likewise, persons born in 1952 are aged 60 in 2013 so
this is the last year in which all persons born between 1952 and 1962 are potentially
in our sample. For this reason, we restrict our analysis to the 1983 to 2013 years
2One concern is that since the survey is based on payroll records it only samples those who earn enough to
be above the PAYE threshold; however Devereux and Hart (2010) have shown that the exclusion of those who
earn very low earnings is not important.
3Since we are interested in the effect of an extra year of school at age 15, by age 20 we expect that the
complier group will mostly be in the labour market.
4We have information on school cohort from 2004 but not for earlier survey years. Because most of our data
are pre-2004, we use calendar year cohort in our analysis. This affects the efficiency of our estimates but not
consistency.
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of the NESPD. If we were to use earlier survey years, some cohorts would not be
present in all years and our estimates could be affected by year effects arising from
periods of very high or low earnings volatility.
We deflate the weekly pay measure to 2013 prices using the Retail Price In-
dex for April and trim the bottom and top 0.5% of earnings each year to eliminate
any outliers or measurement error.5 In addition, we drop observations with sex or
age discrepancies. Finally we drop those with hours of work less than 1 hour per
week. The resulting sample is 1,140,024 observations. The unemployment rate we
use refers to the claimant count rate for the April corresponding to the survey year.
When conducting regional analysis we use the corresponding regional unemploy-
ment rate.
Table 3.1 displays the descriptive statistics for our broad sample that includes
cohorts from 1947 to 1967 and our primary sample that includes just the 1952-62
birth cohorts. The ”Law Affected” variable is 1 if the person was subject to the
higher compulsory schooling age of 16 and zero otherwise.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Males NESPD 1983-2013
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Cohorts = 1947-1967
Year 1,104,104 1997.23 8.48
Cohort 1,104,104 1957.37 6.08
Age 1,104,104 38.95 9.57
Log Weekly Pay 1,104,104 6.33 0.514
Law Affected 1,104,104 .536 0.499
Cohorts = 1952-1962
Year 574,498 1997.15 8.76
Cohort 574,498 1957.25 3.33
Age 574,498 38.99 9.35
Log Weekly Pay 574,498 6.34 0.512
Law Affected 574,498 0.537 0.499
Note: Observations refers to number of person-year observations
5The RPI is the only price index in the UK which covers the sample period. However, there is some concern
that the method overestimates price inflation and, since 1998, there has been a new adjusted RPI called the RPIJ
which uses a similar calculation method to the CPI but unlike the CPI includes housing costs and mortgages in
the basket of goods.
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3.3 Earnings Volatility Measures
We focus on three different measures of earnings volatility – the individual-level
standard deviation of earnings, the degree of earnings cyclicality, and the proba-
bility of experiencing a pay cut. Note that our focus is on variation over time in
earnings for individual workers and we do not study how the cross-sectional vari-
ance of earnings differs by education level. In this section, we discuss the rationale
for each measure and how exactly we implement it in our data.
Standard Deviation of Earnings: We use the standard deviation of log(weekly
pay) as our primary measure of earnings uncertainty faced by men. Since education
may have differing effects on earnings variability at different ages, we construct the
standard deviation for each person at each age using the variation in log(weekly
pay) over the five year period centred on that age. To help describe our basic
approach, we start with the simple statistical model:
yit = Xitβt+ εit (3.1)
Here yit is log(weekly pay) and X is a full set of cohort and year indicators.
As these subsume age indicators, X controls for predictable life-cycle effects on
earnings as well as aggregate shocks that differ across years. The error term, ε ,
then reflects that part of earnings that is not systematically related to cohort, age,
or year. We take a particular year and then keep all observations in the 5 year
window centred on it. So, for example, for 1985, we keep observations from 1983 to
1987. We then estimate the regression above on these data and estimate the standard
deviation of the residual for each individual separately. That is, for each individual,
we calculate the standard deviation of their earnings residual over this 5-year period.
This gives us a measure of earnings volatility for that person in that year. 6 This
procedure gives us one observation for each individual for the middle year of each
5-year period and allows us to estimate the effect of education on earnings volatility
at each age. We use the terms uncertainty and volatility interchangeably, however,
6An alternative to this approach would be to estimate the parameters of an earnings process and use it to
estimate the variances of transitory and permanent components. Our approach has the advantage of not relying
on the specification of some arbitrary parametric form for the income process.
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we acknowledge that part of our measure of earnings volatility may not actually
represent true uncertainty if individuals know in advance the variation in earnings
they face. 7
In practice, for various reasons, it is not the case that every person is in our
sample in every year of each rolling 5-year panel. Therefore, we face a trade-off
in that, if we require people to have valid wage observations in all 5 years, we
will have a much reduced sample size and a quite selected sample. However, if
we estimate the standard deviation in all feasible cases (ie where there are at least
2 observations on the individual), some standard deviations will be much more
precisely estimated than others. In practice, we have taken a compromise position
of requiring a valid wage observation for at least 4 years out of the 5 although we
show later that the results are robust to restricting the sample to those with at least
2, 3, or 5 observations.8
Earnings Cyclicality: The extent to which earnings move in line with the business
cycle is another important measure of earnings volatility. There is a large literature
that studies the relationship between education and the degree of wage cyclicality
but none of these papers attempt to estimate the causal effect of education. 9 The
papers usually estimate regressions with a wage variable as the dependent variable
and some business cycle proxy such as the unemployment rate as a right hand
side regressor and either look separately by education group or interact the unem-
ployment rate with education. However, this may represent only correlations and
obscure the fact that those with different levels of education may differ in other
unobservable ways that affect wage cyclicality.
7 There has been a series of papers in the literature attempting to address this issue – separating what
is known in advance from what is actual uncertainty using, for example, information on education choices
(Cunha et al (2005)) and consumption (Blundell et al (2008)). We do not have data on either of these variables
and therefore we do not attempt to identify how much of the variability is known in advance. As a result,
we interpret our volatility measure as representing an upper bound on the amount of uncertainty faced by an
individual.
8We have examined whether the law affects the probability of having a wage observation in our sample for
at least 4 of the 5 years and found no evidence of any relationship. So, it is unlikely that selection bias is a
problem when we require presence in 4 out of 5 years.
9The literature looking at the effects of wage cyclicality across education groups finds mixed results. On the
one hand, Keane, Solon, Barksy (1991), Stockman (1983), Bils (1985) and Keane and Prasad (1991) find no
difference in wage cyclicality across education groups. However, Freeman (1991), Bartik (1991), Hines et al
(2001) and Hoynes et al (2012) find strong evidence that the low educated are most sensitive to business cycles
while Ammermueller et al. (2009) find the opposite.
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With the recent Great Recession and the associated ‘UK productivity puzzle’
there has been a renewed interest in understanding the effects of recessions on wage
volatility and unemployment in Britain (Gregg et al. (2014), Blundell et al. (2014),
Elsby et al (2010)). 10 However, very few of these papers look at how the effects
differ across education levels. One paper which does provide some evidence of
differences across education is Blundell et al (2014) who show that the large and
unprecedented wage cuts experienced in the Great Recession affected all education
groups uniformly. 11
Our first measure of the business cycle is the unemployment rate in April of
the survey year (the NESPD survey takes place in April). The basic idea is to first
estimate the earnings cyclicality coefficient for each cohort and then to treat the
earnings cyclicality of the cohort as the dependent variable in the second cohort-
level step. We obtain the cyclical coefficients for each cohort by estimating the
following regression for each cohort separately.
∆yit = α0+α1c∆ut+α2year+ εit
Here ∆y denotes the change in log earnings and ∆u denotes the change in the ag-
gregate unemployment rate while controlling for year allows for a linear trend in
earnings growth. 12 We use the estimated coefficient from each cohort-specific
regression α1c, as our measure of the earnings cyclicality experienced by cohort c.
In order to allow for more variation in unemployment rates we add to our ag-
gregate analysis by also exploiting variation in regional unemployment rates. We
use the 12 standard statistical regions used for the UK. The empirical analysis fol-
lows exactly as before except we add region dummies in the first step and use the
region unemployment rate rather than the national unemployment rate. Here r de-
10The UK productivity puzzle refers to the fact that since the onset of the recession output fell by 6% while
unemployment only decreased by 2% resulting in falling output per worker.
11 They find that between 2009 and 2012 real wages decreased by about 10 percent for all education groups.
12By taking the difference in log earnings we increase the robustness of our estimates by getting rid of
unobserved heterogeneity that is fixed over time. This specification is fairly standard in the wage cyclicality
literature and is used, for example, by Solon et al. (1994)
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notes region.
∆yitr = α0+α1c∆utr+α2year+ regionr+ εitr
Figure 3.1 shows the unemployment rates in each region over the sample period.
While the unemployment rates typically tend to move in unison, there is some diver-
gence in unemployment rates between regions.13 Once again, we use the estimated
coefficient from each cohort-specific regression α1c, as our measure of the earnings
cyclicality experienced by cohort c.
Figure 3.1: Regional Unemployment Rates
Pay Cuts: We use the prevalence of pay cuts as an additional measure of earn-
ings volatility. Earnings generally rise over the life-cycle so pay cuts are likely to
be unexpected and unpleasant for workers. Nickell et al. (2002) use occupation
coding to assign workers to skill groups and find that low skilled workers are more
likely to experience nominal pay cuts. But, again, we are unaware of analysis in the
literature of the causal effects of education on the probability of a pay cut. These
issues have become particularly relevant in the recent great recession where there
has been a large surge in both real and nominal pay cuts. In keeping with our analy-
sis of standard deviations, we measure pay cuts as occurring if the weekly pay of a
13 We have also looked at estimates whereby we add year dummies to the first step to allow us to control
for year effects so that we are only left with the variation in unemployment rates that is derived uniquely
from variation across regions and abstracts from any national business cycles. However, due to the fact that
the regional rates are so highly correlated, the standard errors become very large and the estimates are not
informative.
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worker is lower than he received 5 years previously. We define a pay cut to be equal
to 1 if the current weekly pay is less than weekly pay at period t-4, i.e. if at the end
of the 5-year period, weekly pay is less than it was at the beginning of the period.
By studying cuts over a 5-year period, we reduce the number of cuts that occur due
to extremely short-term changes and so should have less noise in our measure. We
focus our analysis only on real pay cuts.
3.4 Estimation Strategy
In 1973 the UK government raised the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16.
This law affected all students in England and Wales born on or after September 1st
1957 and was a follow up to the first raising of the school leaving age (RoSLA) in
1933.14 These laws have been much utilised in the literature in order to estimate the
returns to additional years of education (Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos
(2006), Grenet (2013), Devereux and Hart (2010), Clark and Royer (2013), Buscha
and Dickson (2015)). We use a regression discontinuity design which provides very
robust estimates since we only focus on changes in outcomes of those born on either
side of the cut-off. The resulting estimates will produce a Local Average Treatment
Effect that relates to those induced to increase their schooling due to the law i.e. the
compliers (Angrist and Imbens (1994)).
Our primary approach is to estimate the model non-parametrically using a lo-
cal linear regression with rectangular kernel weights (Hahn et al. (2001)).15 To
focus on cohorts born close to the law change, we restrict the sample to cohorts
born between 1952 and 1962 corresponding to 5 years on either side. However, we
also show estimates where we use bigger bandwidths (cohorts born up to 10 years
each side of the discontinuity) and other specifications such as a global polynomial
approach, similar to Devereux and Hart (2010) and Oreopoulos (2006). One im-
portant issue with regression discontinuity designs is determining the best way to
conduct inference. With cohort-based designs like ours, researchers often choose
to cluster by cohort. However, this has been shown to be very unreliable if the
14In 2013 the school leaving age in England and Wales was raised from 16 to 17 and in 2015 it was raised to
18
15Imbens and Lemieux (2008) suggest using a simple rectangular kernel since using different weights only
changes those estimates which are already sensitive to the bandwidth and thus are already invalid. Moreover
the asympototic bias is independent of the choice of weights.
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number of clusters is small such as in our case where we have 10 cohorts in the
local linear regressions. To avoid this issue we conduct all our analysis at the cohort
level and weight by the number of observations in each cohort to control for any
heteroskedasticity.16
The NESPD dataset contains very accurate earnings data, has large sample
sizes, and has repeated observations on individuals that allow us to construct indi-
vidual measures of earnings volatility. However, it does not contain data on month
of birth. Given persons born after September 1st 1957 were subject to the new com-
pulsory schooling law, we use a ‘donut’ style approach whereby we omit the year
1957 from the estimation.
We focus on the reduced form relationship between the law and our outcome
variables:
Yit = θ0+θ1Lawi+ f (YOBi)+uit (3.2)
Here Y refers to the dependent variable of interest and Law is an indicator variable
denoting whether the individual was born before or after 1957. The function f(.)
represents a smooth function of year of birth. When we use local linear regression
this is a linear function of year of birth that is allowed to have different slopes on
each side of the discontinuity. In other specifications f(.) is proxied by a low order
polynomial.
Our dataset does not have information on years of education. To deal with the
absence of an education variable, we use a Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares
approach similar to Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Devereux and Hart (2010). The
basic idea is to use a separate dataset to obtain the first stage estimate of the effect
of the law on education. Since we have only one instrument for education (the law
change), the TS2SLS estimator is equal to the reduced form effect of the law divided




16This approach is conservative as it implies that our main regressions have only 10 observations.
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Given that the UK compulsory schooling laws have been so widely studied, we
follow Buscha and Dickson (2015) and use 0.30 as our estimate of the first stage.
This is due to the general consensus in the literature that the law increased years
of schooling by about 0.3 for males. Therefore the results that we find using the
NESPD can be multiplied by 3.33 to provide the effect of an extra year of education
on the outcome variable. As a robustness check we also calculated the first stage
using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and found a first stage effect of
0.332 with a standard error equal to 0.061 (see figure 3.2 in the Appendix for a
visual representation). This is very similar to previous studies. The figure below
shows the first stage effect of the compulsory schooling change on the proportion
leaving school at age 15 using the BHPS.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Log Weekly Pay
While our interest is in earnings volatility rather than in the level of earnings, we
provide some context by first showing the effects of the reform on log weekly pay.
Recent research (Bhuller et al. (2013), Buscha and Dickson (2015)) has empha-
sised the importance of variation in the return to education over the lifecycle. Of
particular relevance is Buscha and Dickson (2015) who estimate the returns to the
compulsory schooling law by year using the NESPD. Because there are many dif-
ferences between our analysis and theirs, we show the return at each age using our
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sample and methods. Table 3.2 reports estimates by year and thus tracks out returns
over the life-cycle. For example, the first estimate is for 1983 when the 1957 cohort
is aged 25 (and the 52-62 cohorts used in estimation are aged between 20 and 30).
The final estimate is for 2013 at which point the 1957 cohort is aged 55 and the
cohorts used in estimation are aged between 50 and 60. Importantly, we find that
the results vary over the life cycle with the biggest return when individuals are in
their early 30s. Indeed between 1991 and 1994, when the men are aged 33-36, the
coefficient on the law is about 4% which scales up to a very large return to educa-
tion of about 13%. The returns are lower when men are in their 20s and early 30s.
Also, after the late 30s, the returns decline and the coefficient is even negative in a
few of the later years.17
We also show results where we pool across ages in Table 3.2. First, we take
average log(weekly pay) across all years for each cohort and use it as the dependent
variable, weighting the cohort-specific means by the number of observations for
that cohort so as not to induce heteroskedasticity. The resultant coefficient of 0.018
is not statistically significant but implies a return to an extra year of education of
about 6%. This is similar to what other researchers have found for this law change
using other data sets (Grenet (2013), Dickson (2012)) 18. We also split the sample
in two into a younger group (when the 1957 cohort is aged 25 to 39) and an older
group (when the 1957 cohort is aged 40 to 55) and report separate estimates for
these two groups. Consistent with the life-cycle patterns, we find a larger effect
for the younger group of 0.025. This is statistically significant at the 10% level and
implies a return to education of about 8%. Figures 3.3 - 3.5 in the Appendix provide
a visual impression of these estimates by plotting out average log(weekly pay) by
cohort. Note that there is a clear pattern of earnings falling with cohort for younger
men. This presumably arises because they are on the upward sloping part of their
17While many studies have shown life-cycle relationships between education and earnings, we are only aware
of two studies that show causal estimates by detailed age. Using a very different estimation method Buscha and
Dickson (2015) show a broadly similar pattern of increasing then decreasing returns using the NESPD. Our
estimates are, however, in contrast to results from Norway which show that the returns are typically lower at the
beginning of the life cycle and higher at the end (Bhuller et al. 2013). However the authors note in their paper
that these types of estimates are likely to vary across national and institutional settings.
18Grenet (2013) uses the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from 1993 to 2004 and finds a return of 6-7% while
Dickson (2012) using the British Household Panel Survey 1991 to 2006 finds a 10% return. While our estimate
is lower than these, we show later that our estimates are slightly higher when we use a bigger bandwidth
3.5. Results 64
life-cycle earnings profile.
It is important to note that while our sample gets older as we move to later
survey years, we cannot be sure that differences in estimates by age are true effects
of ageing. This is because the return to education could change across time even
if the average age of sample members was time invariant. One possible reason is
secular changes in the return to education that might arise because of technological
change. Another is cyclical effects that could arise if education influences how
earnings respond to the business cycle. We examine this directly later in the paper.
Table 3.2: Effect of the Law on Log Weekly Pay
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1983 (25) 0.0179 (0.0169) 1999 (41) 0.007 (0.0174)
1984 (26) 0.0266 (0.0177) 2000 (42) 0.0251 (0.0261)
1985 (27) 0.0213 (0.0206) 2001 (43) 0.0165 (0.0206)
1986 (28) 0.0285 (0.0169) 2002 (44) 0.001 (0.0199)
1987 (29) 0.0261 (0.0211) 2003 (45) 0.0172 (0.0206)
1988 (30) 0.0106 (0.0229) 2004 (46) 0.0054 (0.0233)
1989 (31) 0.0292 (0.0166) 2005 (47) 0.0226 (0.0256)
1990 (32) 0.0301 (0.0182) 2006 (48) 0.0239 (0.0239)
1991 (33) 0.0354* (0.0181) 2007 (49) 0.0375 (0.0219)
1992 (34) 0.0468*** (0.0113) 2008 (50) 0.0255 (0.0282)
1993 (35) 0.0457* (0.0192) 2009 (51) 0.0317 (0.0191)
1994 (36) 0.0426** (0.0144) 2010 (52) -0.0143 (0.0126)
1995 (37) 0.0275* (0.0133) 2011 (53) 0.0104 (0.0167)
1996 (38) 0.0213 (0.0171) 2012 (54) 0.0052 (0.0122)
1997 (39) 0.0176 (0.01) 2013 (55) -0.0089 (0.0206)
1998 (40) -0.0029 (0.0183)
Young (aged less than 40) 0.0252* (0.0123) n=302,527
Older (aged 40+) 0.0143 (0.0159) n=271,971
All 0.018 (0.0121) n=574,498
All regressions done at the cohort level weighted by the number of observations per cohort. Standard errors
in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
3.5.2 Standard Deviation of Earnings
Table 3.3 shows the effects of the law on the standard deviation of earnings over the
life cycle. Because, we can only estimate this for the middle year in each rolling
5-year period, we have estimates by year from 1985 to 2011. What is immediately
clear from the table is that most of the effect of education on earnings volatility hap-
pens at young ages with more education leading to less volatility. There are large
effects of education around age 27-32 in the range of about 0.01. The average stan-
dard deviation for the 1957 cohort in this age range is 0.15. Therefore a coefficient
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of -0.01 implies about a 7% reduction. When translated into our 2SLS estimate, this
implies that an extra year of education decreases earnings volatility by around 0.03
or by about 20% of the mean which is quite a large effect. However, the size of the
effects gets smaller as men age and many of the point estimates even become posi-
tive (albeit statistically insignificant) as men approach their 50s. One interpretation
of this pattern is that more education helps people to find better and more stable
job matches in their early career but the effect becomes unimportant at older ages
when most individuals have found suitable job matches. Of course, as mentioned
earlier, an alternative possibility is that these are time rather than age effects and
that education particularly sheltered workers during the 1985-1990 period. While
we can’t rule out this possibility, the general pattern seems more consistent with an
age rather than a cyclical effect. As in Table 3.2, we also report estimates where
we increase precision by pooling across age groups. We find a statistically signif-
icant effect of -0.0065 for men aged less than 40 but no evidence of any effect for
older men. Over the entire life cycle, the average effect is -0.0042 indicating that,
while allowing that the effects differ over the life-cycle, on average, men experience
lower earning volatility if they were subject to the law change. Scaling up by the
first stage to extrapolate to the effect of an extra year of education, we find that over
the whole life cycle an extra year of education leads to a lower standard deviation
of earnings of about 0.012 or about 10% of the mean. Figures 3.6 - 3.8 in the Ap-
pendix provide a visual impression of these estimates. While the discontinuity is
obvious for younger men, there is no obvious jump for the 1957 cohort in the older
sample. Note that there is a clear pattern of earnings uncertainty rising with cohort
for younger men. This arises because earnings uncertainty falls with age as workers
become more settled into the labour market and the variability of earnings changes
declines.
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Table 3.3: Effect of the Law on the Standard Deviation of Log Earnings
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1985 (27) -0.0111** (0.0029) 1999 (41) -0.0055 (0.0051)
1986 (28) -0.0118 (0.0067) 2000 (42) -0.0068** (0.0019)
1987 (29) -0.0081 (0.0056) 2001 (43) -0.0042 (0.0056)
1988 (30) -0.0111*** (0.0024) 2002 (44) -0.0043 (0.0049)
1989 (31) -0.0102*** (0.0025) 2003 (45) 0.0001 (0.0056)
1990 (32) -0.0068 (0.0056) 2004 (46) 0.0034 (0.0058)
1991 (33) -0.005 (0.0034) 2005 (47) 0.001 (0.0068)
1992 (34) -0.0015 (0.0058) 2006 (48) -0.0036 (0.0053 )
1993 (35) -0.0042 (0.0063) 2007 (49) -0.0088 (0.0061)
1994 (36) -0.005 (0.0041) 2008 (50) -0.0016 (0.0038)
1995 (37) -0.0047 (0.0047) 2009 (51) -0.0009 (0.0066)
1996 (38) -0.0059 (0.0034) 2010 (52) 0.0032 (0.0071)
1997 (39) -0.0044 (0.0034) 2011 (53) 0.006 (0.0049)
1998 (40) -0.006 (0.0044)
Young (aged less than 40) -0.0065** (0.0027) n = 197,741
Older (aged 40+) -0.0021 (0.0028) n = 175,943
All -0.0042 (0.0026) n = 373,684
Standard deviations measured in the 5-year period centred around the listed year with at least 4 observations
per window. Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957
cohort omitted. All regressions done at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations
per cohort. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
In the estimates so far, we require at least 4 wage observations per person in
each 5-year window. In Table 3.4, we examine whether the estimates are sensitive
to using different requirements. First, looking at the sample sizes, we see that as
we move from the least restrictive (only requiring 2 observations) to the most re-
strictive (requiring all 5), we lose over half the person-year observations. However,
the estimates are quite robust – the effect of the law on the younger group varies
between -0.0063 and -0.0072 and is always statistically significant. Likewise, there
is never any evidence of an effect on the older group.
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Table 3.4: Effect of the Law on the Standard Deviation of Earnings
Effect Sample Size
SD calculated using at least 2 obs
Young -0.0064** (0.0026) 255,679
Old -0.0017 (0.0028) 235,281
All -0.0041 (0.0025) 490,960
SD calculated using at least 3 obs
Young -0.0063* (0.0026) 238,787
Old -0.002 (0.0025) 218,468
All -0.004 (0.0024) 457,255
SD calculated using at least 4 obs
Young -0.0065** (0.0027) 197,741
Old -0.0021 (0.0028) 175,943
All -0.0042 (0.0026) 373,684
SD calculated using at least 5 obs
Young -0.0072* (0.0031) 126,388
Old 0.0011 (0.0025) 111,500
All -0.0031 (0.0026) 237,888
All regressions done at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort.
Standard deviations measured in the 5-year period centred around the listed year. Local linear regression
estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort omitted. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
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3.5.3 Earnings Cyclicality
As mentioned earlier, we calculate an earnings cyclicality coefficient for each co-
hort. To estimate the effect of the law on earnings cyclicality, we do a cohort-level
regression where we regress the cyclicality coefficient for each cohort on the law
using the local linear specification. As before, in this second step, the regression is
weighted by the number of observations in each cohort. The estimates are reported
in Table 3.5.
Because we need a large time dimension to reliably estimate the earnings cycli-
cality coefficients, we cannot study how the effect of the law on earnings cyclicality
varies at each individual age. We report estimates for the full set of years (1983-
2013) and also split the sample by age group (younger versus older) as before.
However, the standard errors become very high for the older group so this estimate
is not very informative. As is the case for our other outcomes, the effect for the
younger group is larger than that for workers as a whole and suggests that more
education reduces the earnings cyclicality experienced by men. In Table 3.5 we see
that the effect of the law on earnings cyclicality is about .0039 overall and 0.0044
for the younger group and the estimate is very significant.
Table 3.5: Effect of the Law on Earnings Cyclicality
Sample Effect Sample Size
Young (aged less than 40) 0.0044*** (0.0008) 223,974
Older (40+) 0.0002 (0.0056) 202,412
All 0.0039*** (0.0008) 441,890
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort omitted.
All regressions done at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
To get a sense of the magnitudes, it is helpful to look at figures 3.9 - 3.11. The
pictures show the estimated earnings cyclicality coefficient by cohort. For young
men, this is always negative, reflecting the fact that earnings are mildly procyclical
with estimates ranging from close to zero to -0.008. These suggest that a one point
increase in the unemployment rate reduces earnings by between 0 and 1%. There
is clear jump for the 1957 cohort with the levels of cyclicality being lower (in ab-
solute terms) after the law change than before. This is despite the fact that earnings
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cyclicality is decreasing with age for our sample.
In practice, we estimate earnings cyclicality over the 1983-1997 period when
studying the younger groups and the 1998-2013 period for the older groups. There-
fore, the greater effect of the law on earnings cyclicality in the younger group could
reflect the fact that education had less protective effect during the Great Recession
than it had in the recession of the 1990s. This is plausible as the Great Recession
had disproportionate impacts on financial industries that employ a lot of people
with higher education. It is difficult to distinguish this effect from the possibility
that education has less impact on the cyclical swings experienced by older peo-
ple. However, our previous estimates of decreased standard deviation of earnings at
younger ages would tend to support the age rather than time based explanation.19
3.5.3.1 Regional shocks
Table 3.6: Effect of the Law on Regional Earnings Cyclicality
Sample Effect Sample Size
Young (aged less than 40) 0.0038*** (0.0007) 223,974
Older (40+) 0.0007 (0.0053) 202,412
All 0.0034** (0.001) 441,890
The cyclical indicator is the contemporaneous regional unemployment rate for April. All regressions done
at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
Table 3.6 shows the regional cyclicality estimates. The results are similar to the
estimates using the national unemployment rate both in terms of the coefficient
estimates and standard errors. This is not surprising since Figure 3.1 highlights
that unemployment rates tend to move in parallel across regions. However, it is
reassuring that, once we look within region and so control for any regional effects,
the negative effect of the law change on earnings cyclicality remains.
3.5.4 Pay cuts
Table 3.7 shows the effect of the law on the probability of a real pay cut in each 5-
year period centred on the reported year. We define the pay cut variable to be equal
to 1 if the real weekly pay at the end of the 5-year period is less than what it was
19Much research has found that younger people are more sensitive to the business cycle, for example, Hoynes
et al (2012) and Elsby et al (2010).
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at the beginning of the period. So, for example, for the year 1987 in Table 3.7, the
estimate shows the effect of the law change on the probability that the real weekly
pay in 1989 is lower than that in 1985. There is no clear pattern in the results with
education leading to a lower probability of receiving a cut in some years, for exam-
ple, in 1989, 1992 and 2004 but at other times leading to an increased likelihood
of a pay cut. The effect of education on lowering the probability of receiving a pay
cut in 1992 is consistent with the fact that the 1990’s recession had large adverse
effects on those with the least education. It is not clear why the effects in 2004 are
so large but it is something that we think deserves further investigation. Overall the
effect of the law is to reduce the probability of a pay cut by 1.1 percentage points
which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The average probablity of a pay
cut for the 1957 cohort over the sample period is 0.342. Therefore a coefficient of
-0.011 implies about a 3.2% reduction. When translated into our 2SLS estimate,
this implies that an extra year of education reduces the probability of receiving a
pay cut by about 10.6 percent. However, it is important to keep in mind that there
is a lot of heterogeneity across years with positive coefficients in some years and
negative ones in others.
The increased probability of the higher educated receiving a pay cut between
2007 and 2011 (as shown by the 2009 estimate) is consistent with evidence that the
Great Recession had a bigger impact on those with more education, in particular
bankers and those working in the financial industry. 20 Therefore, it appears that,
in the Great Recession, more education led to a higher probability of taking a real
earnings cut. 21 This highlights how the effects of education on pay cuts can be very
heterogeneous and suggests that the average effects over the entire period should be
treated with caution.
20This is not surprising given that in 2009 financial institutions reacted to the Lehman brother’s scandal by
cutting pay.
21 We have looked at year-by-year wage changes to examine this further and found that those affected by the
law change were more likely to experience a pay cut between 2008 and 2009 but there is no evidence of adverse
effects of education in the years after 2009.
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Table 3.7: Effect of the Law on the Probability of a Real Weekly Pay Cut (over 5-Year Period)
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1985 (27) -0.0154 (0.0107) 1999 (41) -0.0207 (0.012)
1986 (28) -0.0253 (0.0132) 2000 (42) -0.025 (0.0214)
1987 (29) -0.0001 (0.0169) 2001 (43) 0.0014 (0.0193)
1988 (30) -0.0123 (0.0103) 2002 (44) 0.0088 (0.0147)
1989 (31) -0.0196* (0.0096) 2003 (45) -0.0164 (0.03)
1990 (32) -0.0291 (0.0215) 2004 (46) -0.0623*** (0.0164)
1991 (33) -0.0001 (0.0158) 2005 (47) -0.0117 (0.0201)
1992 (34) -0.03* (0.0143) 2006 (48) -0.045 (0.0332)
1993 (35) -0.0047 (0.0154) 2007 (49) -0.0074 (0.018)
1994 (36) 0.0172* (0.0077) 2008 (50) -0.0004 (0.0159)
1995 (37) 0.038* (0.0179) 2009 (51) 0.043* (0.0197)
1996 (38) 0.0256 (0.022) 2010 (52) 0.0275 (0.0214)
1997 (39) -0.0116 (0.0099) 2011 (53) 0.0167 (0.015)
1998 (40) -0.0073 (0.0165)
Young (aged less than 40) -0.0082* (0.0037) n = 157,710
Older (aged 40+) -0.0094 (0.0063) n = 195,484
All -0.011** (0.0045) n = 353,194
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort omitted.
All regressions done at the cohort with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort. Standard
errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
3.6 Robustness Checks
In this section we perform some robustness checks for each of our outcome mea-
sures. The estimates are reported in the Appendix.
3.6.1 Bandwidth and Model Specification
First, we look at the effects of changing the bandwidth and the model specifica-
tion. To compare with our baseline estimates that do local linear regression using
a bandwidth of 5, we examine the effect of bandwidths of 7 and 10 using a range
of different specifications. Since the fit can vary greatly between specifications, we
use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to pick the model that fits best in each
case. With the bandwidth of 5, the standard errors get very high when we use high
order polynomials. Therefore, for this bandwidth, we only report a global quadratic
in addition to the local linear specification. For bandwidths 7 and 10, we report
local quadratic estimates that allow a different quadratic function each side of the
discontinuity and also global quadratic, cubic, and quartic specifications. In each
case, the estimate favoured by the AIC criterion is reported in bold.
The estimates are in Tables 3.8 to 3.12. In general, we find that, once one
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chooses the specification with the best fit for each bandwidth, the estimates are quite
robust to specification. One finding is that the effect of the law on log(earnings) is
stronger with the bandwidth of 10 – here we find statistically significant estimates
of about 3% for the young and 2% for the older men. On average the effect of the
law is about 2% which implies a return to education of about 7%. The estimates
for the standard deviation, for earnings cyclicality, and for pay cuts are all similar
across bandwidths. We conclude that our findings are quite robust to the choice of
bandwidth or specification.
3.6.2 Excluding Scotland
We also analyse the effect of excluding people who live in Scotland as the law only
affected those born in England and Wales. Because we don’t have information on
country of birth, we cannot tell whether persons living in Scotland were actually
born there or in England or Wales. However, removing Scottish residents still con-
stitutes a useful robustness check. The estimates are in Table 3.13. Once again, the
estimates are very similar to our baseline results.
3.6.3 Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual Level
We have conducted all our analysis at the cohort level and weighted by the number
of observations in each cohort to control for any heteroskedasticity. An alternative
approach to inference is not to group by cohort but to instead treat deviation from
the local linear or polynomial fit as specification error and report robust standard
errors (Chamberlain, 1994). In situations where we pool years and so have repeated
observations on individuals, we implement this method by clustering by individual.
As a check on our earlier estimates, we report these standard errors in Tables 3.14
to 3.16. Given that earnings cyclicality is measured at the cohort level, it is not
possible to generate standard errors at the individual level for this outcome. We find
that the level of statistical significance is generally similar with this approach com-




This paper finds that education leads to a decrease in lifetime earnings volatility,
particularly for younger men. We look at the effects of education on earnings un-
certainty via the effects on earnings volatility, real pay cuts and earnings cyclical-
ity. Across all three mechanisms the results point towards benefits from education
through sheltering one from the adverse effects of earnings shocks. The effects vary
over the life cycle with education leading to benefits in terms of reduced earnings
volatility and cyclicality at younger ages but with no discernible benefits for persons
aged over 40. Our findings for real wage cuts are quite heterogenous with the effects
varying in magnitude and sign across different years. On average, however, more
educated workers appear less likely to experience real wage cuts. The estimates are
robust across many specifications. Overall, our paper identifies another, and largely
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Varying Bandwidth and Specification
Table 3.8: Effect of the Law on Log Weekly Pay
Young Old All
Bandwidth = 5
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0252* (0.0123) 0.0143 (0.0159) 0.018 (0.0121)
Global Quadratic 0.0251* (0.0112) 0.0139 (0.0151) 0.0179 (0.0112)
Sample Size 302,527 271,971 574,498
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0015 (0.0144) 0.021* (0.0112) 0.0037 (0.0121)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0456* (0.0219) -0.0004 (0.0211) 0.0271 (0.021)
Global Quadratic 0.0016 (0.0153) 0.0209* (0.0115) 0.0038 (0.0125)
Global Cubic 0.0377* (0.0185) 0.0092 (0.0175) 0.0254 (0.0176)
Global Quartic 0.0369** (0.0159) 0.0074 (0.0174) 0.0237 (0.0155)
Sample Size 417,611 377,869 795,480
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.019 (0.0121) 0.0234** (0.0098) -0.0128 (0.0101)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0332** (0.014) 0.0103 (0.0157) 0.0233 (0.0137)
Global Quadratic -0.0185 (0.0127) 0.0225** (0.0089) -0.0127 (0.0103)
Global Cubic 0.0193 (0.0135) 0.0138 (0.0129) 0.0148 (0.0121)
Global Quartic 0.0198 (0.013) 0.0149 (0.0132) 0.0144 (0.0123)
Sample Size 578,171 525,933 1,104,104
All regressions done at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort. Stan-
dard errors in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike Information
Criterion. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
Table 3.9: Effect of the Law on the Standard Deviation of Weekly Pay
Young Old All
Bandwidth = 5
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0065** (0.0027) -0.0021 (0.0028) -0.0042 (0.0026)
Global Quadratic -0.0065** (0.0027) -0.0021 (0.0029) -0.0042 (0.0026)
Sample Size 197,741 175,943 373,684
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0035 (0.0026) -0.0025 (0.0022) -0.0025 (0.0022)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) -0.0086* (0.0041) -0.0016 (0.0045) -0.0055 (0.004)
Global Quadratic -0.0035 (0.0025) -0.0025 (0.0022) -0.0024 (0.0021)
Global Cubic -0.0072* (0.0036) -0.0014 (0.0035) -0.0045 (0.0032)
Global Quartic -0.0073** (0.0031) -0.0016 (0.0036) -0.0046 (0.003)
Sample Size 273,186 244,299 517,485
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0001 (0.0022) -0.0018 (0.0022) 0.0005 (0.0021)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) -0.0074** (0.0032) -0.0016 (0.0041) -0.0049 (0.0034)
Global Quadratic -0.0001 (0.0022) -0.0017 (0.0023) 0.0004 (0.0021)
Global Cubic -0.0054* (0.0027) -0.0014 (0.0034) -0.0033 (0.0028)
Global Quartic -0.0052* (0.0028) -0.0013 (0.0035) -0.0033 (0.0029)
Sample Size 378,017 337,411 715,428
All regressions done at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort. Year
of birth equal to 1957 is omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model
according to the Akaike Information Criterion. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
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Table 3.10: Effect of the Law on Weekly Pay Cyclicality
Young Old All
Bandwidth = 5
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0044*** (0.0008) 0.0002 (0.0056) 0.0039*** (0.0008)
Global Quadratic 0.0044*** (0.0008) 0.0003 (0.0059) 0.0039*** (0.0009)
Sample Size 223,974 202,412 441,890
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0033*** (0.0008) 0.0035 (0.0052) 0.0032*** (0.0006)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0046** (0.0014) -0.0003 (0.0077) 0.0045*** (0.001)
Global Quadratic 0.0033*** (0.0007) 0.0038 (0.0049) 0.0032*** (0.0006)
Global Cubic 0.0044*** (0.0011) 0.0017 (0.0078) 0.0042*** (0.0009)
Global Quartic 0.0044*** (0.0011) 0.0009 (0.0077) 0.0042*** (0.001)
Sample Size 308,167 280,359 610,332
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0008 (0.0012) 0.0043 (0.0049) 0.0008 (0.0012)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.006*** (0.0012) -0.0017 (0.0083) 0.0059*** (0.0011)
Global Quadratic 0.0008 (0.0012) 0.0045 (0.0048) 0.0008 (0.0012)
Global Cubic 0.0047*** (0.0012) -0.0003 (0.0069) 0.0048*** (0.0011)
Global Quartic 0.0049*** (0.0008) -0.0008 (0.0071) 0.0047*** (0.0008)
Sample Size 425,838 387,590 844,682
The contemporaneous national rate of unemployment for April is used as the cyclical indicator. All regres-
sions done at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort. Standard errors
in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike Information Criterion.
Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
Table 3.11: Effect of the Law on Regional Weekly Pay Cyclicality
Young Old All
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0038*** (0.0007) 0.0007 (0.0053) 0.0034** (0.001)
Global Quadratic 0.0038*** (0.0008) 0.0008 (0.0054) 0.0034*** (0.001)
Sample Size 223,974 202,412 441,890
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.003*** (0.0006) 0.0034 (0.0046) 0.003*** (0.0007)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.004*** (0.0012) -0.0003 0.0074 0.0038** (0.0012)
Global Quadratic 0.003*** (0.0006) 0.0036 (0.0043) 0.003*** (0.0007)
Global Cubic 0.0039*** (0.0009) 0.0013 (0.0068) 0.0036*** (0.0011)
Global Quartic 0.0039*** (0.001) 0.0008 (0.007) 0.0036** (0.0011)
Sample Size 308,167 280,359 610,332
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0007 (0.0011) 0.0024 (0.0038) 0.0007 (0.0011)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0055*** (0.0011) 0.0003 (0.0069) 0.0053*** (0.0011)
Global Quadratic 0.0007 (0.0011) 0.0013 (0.0025) 0.0008 (0.0011)
Global Cubic 0.0044*** (0.0011) 0.0006 (0.0056) 0.0044*** (0.001)
Global Quartic 0.0045*** (0.0007) 0.0006 (0.0058) 0.0043*** (0.0009)
Sample Size 425,838 387,590 844,682
The contemporaneous regional rate of unemployment for April is used as the cyclical indicator. All regres-
sions done at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort. Standard errors
in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike Information Criterion.
Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
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Table 3.12: Effect of the Law on Probability of Real Weekly Pay Cut over 5-Year Period
Young Old All
Bandwidth = 5
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0082* (0.0037) -0.0093 (0.0063) -0.011** (0.0045)
Global Quadratic -0.0082** (0.0025) -0.0094 (0.0064) -0.011** (0.0043)
Sample Size 157,710 195,484 353,194
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0132* (0.0065) -0.0196** (0.0077) -0.0218*** (0.0059)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) -0.0078 (0.0118) 0.0063 (0.0096) 0.0009 (0.0074)
Global Quadratic -0.0132* (0.0069) -0.0199** (0.0072) -0.0218*** (0.0061)
Global Cubic -0.01 (0.011) -0.0005 (0.0076) -0.0049 (0.0063)
Global Quartic -0.01 (0.0088) -0.0001 (0.0078) -0.0053 (0.0059)
Sample Size 215,787 270,848 486,635
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.009* (0.005) -0.0188** (0.0067) -0.0225*** (0.0041)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) -0.0111 (0.0082) -0.0138 (0.0108) -0.0151* (0.0072)
Global Quadratic -0.0092* (0.0052) -0.0194*** (0.006) -0.0224*** (0.0045)
Global Cubic -0.012 (0.0077) -0.0167* (0.009) -0.0182** (0.0066)
Global Quartic -0.0112 (0.0076) -0.0176* (0.009) -0.0184*** (0.0062)
Sample Size 294,567 374,496 669,063
All regressions done at the cohort level weighted by the number of observations per cohort. Standard errors
in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike Information Criterion.
Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
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Effect of Omitting Scottish Residents
Table 3.13: Effect of the Law after Omitting Scottish Residents
Sample Baseline n Omit Scotland n
Log Weekly Pay
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0252* (0.0123) 302,527 0.0183 (0.0123) 274,430
Older (40+) 0.0143 (0.0159) 271,971 0.0115 (0.0153) 246,772
All 0.018 (0.0121) 574,498 0.0129 (0.0115) 521,202
Standard Deviation
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0065** (0.0027) 197,741 -0.0075** (0.0030) 179,648
Older (40+) -0.0021 (0.0028) 175,943 -0.0008 (0.0032) 159,325
All -0.0042 (0.0026) 373,684 -0.0041 (0.003) 338,973
Earnings Cyclicality
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0044*** (0.0008) 223,974 0.0046*** (0.0011) 203,244
Older (40+) 0.0002 (0.0056) 202,412 0.0014 (0.0057) 183,351
All 0.0039*** (0.0008) 441,890 0.0042*** (0.001) 400,636
Regional Earnings Cyclicality
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0038*** (0.0007) 223,974 0.0036*** (0.0009) 202,722
Older (40+) 0.0002 (0.0056) 202,412 0.0018 (0.0055) 182,839
All 0.0039** (0.0008) 441,890 0.0034** (0.0011) 399,567
Real Pay Cut
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0082* (0.0037) 157,710 -0.0083 (0.0065) 143,233
Older (40+) -0.0093 (0.0063) 195,484 -0.0061 (0.0062) 176,995
All -0.011** (0.0045) 353,194 -0.0094 (0.0053) 320,228
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort omitted.
All regressions done at the cohort level with weights equal to the number of observations per cohort.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
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Effect of Using Robust Standard Errors
Table 3.14: Effect of the Law on Log Weekly Pay
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1983 (25) 0.0179 (0.011) 1999 (41) 0.007 (0.017)
1984 (26) 0.0266** (0.0116) 2000 (42) 0.0251 (0.0173)
1985 (27) 0.0213* (0.0121) 2001 (43) 0.0165 (0.018)
1986 (28) 0.0285** (0.0123) 2002 (44) 0.001 (0.0183)
1987 (29) 0.0261** (0.013) 2003 (45) 0.0172 (0.0182)
1988 (30) 0.0106 (0.0133) 2004 (46) 0.0054 (0.0187)
1989 (31) 0.0292** (0.0136) 2005 (47) 0.0226 (0.0191)
1990 (32) 0.0301** (0.0137) 2006 (48) 0.0239 (0.0194)
1991 (33) 0.0354** (0.0139) 2007 (49) 0.0375* (0.0225)
1992 (34) 0.0468*** (0.0146) 2008 (50) 0.0255 (0.0229)
1993 (35) 0.0457*** (0.0152) 2009 (51) 0.0317 (0.0207)
1994 (36) 0.0426*** (0.0153) 2010 (52) -0.0143 (0.0213)
1995 (37) 0.0275* (0.0162) 2011 (53) 0.0104 (0.0216)
1996 (38) 0.0213 (0.0166) 2012 (54) 0.0052 (0.0228)
1997 (39) 0.0176 (0.0169) 2013 (55) -0.0089 (0.024)
1998 (40) -0.0029 (0.0168)
Young (aged less than 40) 0.0252*** (0.0095) n=302,527
Older (aged 40+) 0.0143 (0.0141) n=271,971
All 0.0181* (0.0105) n=574,498
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, **
at .05 and * at .10
Table 3.15: Effect of the Law on the Standard Deviation of Log Weekly Pay
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1985 (27) -0.0111*** (0.0042) 1999 (41) -0.0055 (0.0045)
1986 (28) -0.0118*** (0.0043) 2000 (42) -0.0068** (0.0047)
1987 (29) -0.0081* (0.0042) 2001 (43) -0.0042 (0.0047)
1988 (30) -0.0111** (0.0043) 2002 (44) -0.0043 (0.0047)
1989 (31) -0.0102** (0.0042) 2003 (45) 0.0001 (0.0048)
1990 (32) -0.0068 (0.0042) 2004 (46) 0.0034 (0.0047)
1991 (33) -0.005 (0.0043) 2005 (47) 0.001 (0.005)
1992 (34) -0.0015 (0.0043) 2006 (48) -0.0036 (0.0054)
1993 (35) -0.0042 (0.0046) 2007 (49) -0.0088 (0.0056)
1994 (36) -0.005 (0.0046) 2008 (50) -0.0016 (0.0058)
1995 (37) -0.0047 (0.0046) 2009 (51) -0.0009 (0.0057)
1996 (38) -0.0059 (0.0046) 2010 (52) 0.0032 (0.0052)
1997 (39) -0.0044 (0.0046) 2011 (53) 0.006 (0.0054)
1998 (40) -0.006 (0.0046)
Young (aged less than 40) -.0065** (0.0026) n = 197,741
Older (aged 40+) -0.0021 (0.0028) n = 175,943
All -0.0042** (0.0021) n = 373,684
Standard deviations measured in the 5-year period centred around the listed year with at least 4 observations
per window. Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957
cohort omitted. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthesis. Significance
level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10
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Table 3.16: Effect of the Law on the Probability of a Real Weekly Pay Cut (over 5-Year Period)
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1985 (27) -0.0154 (0.0157) 1999 (41) -0.0207 (0.019)
1986 (28) -0.0253* (0.015) 2000 (42) -0.025 (0.0181)
1987 (29) -0.0001 (0.0155) 2001 (43) 0.0014 (0.0188)
1988 (30) -0.0123 (0.0165) 2002 (44) 0.0088 (0.0192)
1989 (31) -0.0196* (0.0171) 2003 (45) -0.0164 (0.0199)
1990 (32) -0.0291 (0.0177) 2004 (46) -0.0623*** (0.0202)
1991 (33) -0.0001 (0.0179) 2005 (47) -0.0117 (0.0228)
1992 (34) -0.03* (0.0176) 2006 (48) -0.045* (0.0235)
1993 (35) -0.0047 (0.0178) 2007 (49) -0.0074 (0.0208)
1994 (36) 0.0172 (0.018) 2008 (50) -0.0004 (0.0214)
1995 (37) 0.038** (0.0186) 2009 (51) 0.043* (0.0229)
1996 (38) 0.0256 (0.0184) 2010 (52) 0.0275 (0.023)
1997 (39) -0.0116 (0.0182) 2011 (53) 0.0167 (0.019)
1998 (40) -0.0073 (0.0186)
Young (aged less than 40) -0.0082 (0.0066) n = 157,710
Older (aged 40+) -0.0094 (0.0067) n = 195,484
All -0.011** (0.0051) n = 353,194
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort omitted.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, **
at .05 and * at .10
Chapter 4
To Go to College or Not? The Role of Ability,
Family Background and Risk
The earnings premium associated with going to college has risen substantially over
the past few decades yet still less than half of students do not go to college. Why is
this? Are the reported estimates missing something? Surely if returns are so large,
estimated to be between 30% and 50% (Cunha et al (2011)), it would make sense for
everyone to go. Perhaps individuals suspect that the average return may conceal the
fact that there is a distribution of returns and that it may be that very high returns are
driven by those at the top of the distribution with meagre returns for the majority. It
may also be that individuals do not base their decision purely on monetary returns
but take in to account many other factors such as how risky a college investment is,
how likely it is that they will succeed in college, whether their parents approve of
their decision or the cost of acquiring the education. There are thus many factors de-
termining whether one should attend college or not. The opportunity to earn money
and experience straight after high school is a very tempting factor which many
teenagers may be unwilling to forgo. There is also the psychic cost to education
(Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005,
2006), Cunha and Heckman (2006), Hai and Heckman (2015)); although many
teenagers may be aware that attending college will increase their lifetime earnings,
the disutility from attending college may be enough to deter them from undertaking
such an endeavour. Those with lower cognitive ability may find that the course-
work is too difficult while those with lower non-cognitive ability may not have the
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determination, motivation or self-application to complete the course.1 Heckman,
Stixrud and Urzua (2006) find that both cognitive and non-cognitive skills have a
large impact on both wages and the decision to attend college.
Furthermore, family background may influence the college decision. Family
background could affect college attendance via many channels including family in-
come, parental education, genetic traits, child investment, quality of the neighbour-
hood, or tastes for education. There is a large literature examining credit constraints
but the majority find little evidence that such constraints exist (Keane and Wolpin
(1997), Caneiro and Heckman (2002), Cameron and Taber (2004)). However, Bel-
ley and Lochner (2007) using the NLSY find that for more recent cohorts credit
constraints are binding. Abbot et al (2016) also find that parental wealth is signif-
icant in a regression of college attendence; however they urge caution in interpret-
ing this as evidence of credit constraints since parental wealth may be correlated
with psychic costs of schooling. The evidence of whether parental education has
any effect on childrens’ education is mixed; some studies such as Chevalier (2003)
and Oreopoulos et al (2006) find that there is a causal effect of parental education
on child’s education while the evidence by Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005)
and Lee, Roys and Seshardi (2015) suggests that the observed correlation is due
to selection rather than any causal effect.2 Family background may also affect the
decision to go college due to the culture towards education which is created within
the household. An individual may grow up in a household where the parents may
not value education and may instil this dislike of education in to the child. Parental
interest in the child’s education may play an important role in encouraging indi-
viduals to attend college; children who do not have the support, encouragement or
interest of their parents in their education may become disengaged from school and
subsequently become unlikely to attain good grades and go to college.
Finally, risk may play a big part in this decision.3 Human capital like any other
1Policies aimed at pushing all students in to college regardless of their ability may be ill-warranted if such
students go on to drop out. Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) find that those who drop out of high school have lower
ability and motivation, lower expectations of the rewards from staying on and a lower consumption value of
school attendance.
2See Bjorklund and Salvanes (2011) for a summary and evaluation of recent literature on family background
and education.
3There were a handful of papers looking at this topic in the 1970s and 1980s including Levhari and Weiss
(1974), Williams (1979), Nickell (1979), Eaton and Rosen (1980), Kodde (1986). More recent papers examin-
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investment is subject to the perils of risk. An individual deciding whether to invest
in education faces uncertainty concerning whether they will graduate on time or at
all, the type of job they will get, their future earnings and what fraction of time
will be spent in employment. Income levels among observationally similar people
may differ due to luck, social connectedness, illness, promotions, ability, different
training opportunities or motivation and therefore there is a wide range of potential
earnings outcomes which may be realised. To the extent that the college earnings
distribution is significantly skewed to the right, a typical college graduate will earn
significantly less than average earnings and consequently risk averse individuals
may be willing to trade high earnings for low risk and may decide not to go to
college. Given that there does not exist any market that insures against low returns
to education this may explain part of the reason why many students do not progress
to further education despite the perceived benefits.4
On the other hand, it is well documented that those with more education are
less likely to experience spells of unemployment (Mincer, 1991) and this will tend
to make college more attractive since if higher educated individuals face lower un-
employment rates they will be in receipt of income for a larger fraction of their lives.
5 However, in order to rigorously examine whether this is indeed the case, it is nec-
essary to have a life cycle model since the dynamic effects of unemployment may
differ across education levels due to varying levels of human capital depreciation,
costs of foregone work experience and the impact on future wages and employment
prospects due to scarring and atrophy. Additionally, the system of unemployment
insurance that exists will also have a bearing on the outcome; generous unemploy-
ment benefits may help to negate the adverse affects of unemployment.
There are thus many factors which may impact the decision to go to college
ing this topic include Harmon, Hogan, and Walker (2003), Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), Belzil and
Hansen (2004), Hartog and Diaz-Serrano (2007) and Brown, Fang and Gomes (2012).
4The evidence on whether education increases wage risk is mixed; Cunha and Heckman (2007) find the
variance of earnings to be larger for college graduates. On the other hand, Chen (2002) finds that once known
heterogeneity is accounted for, risk does not rise with education while Meghir and Pistaferri (2006) and Abbot
et al (2013) find no difference in wage risk across education levels. However, Delaney and Devereux (2016)
using a compulsory school leaving age reform find evidence that those with more schooling experience less
wage volatility over the life cycle.
5Education may lead to lower rates of unemployment if those with more education have higher levels of hu-
man capital, are less likely to be fired due to higher training costs and have the option to downgrade occupation
in times of recession.
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and it is paramount that any study attempting to understand the decision to go to
college and the subsequent returns which are obtained take into account as many
pertinent factors as possible. In this paper I estimate a structural life cycle model
with savings, labour supply, ability, human capital accumulation and depreciation,
employment risk and wage risk. In addition, similar to Keane and Wolpin (1997)
who have a dynamic model of schooling, work, and occupational choice, I explicitly
model the education decision. Their model is quite different to mine as they do not
allow for unemployment risk, for persistent wage shocks nor do they include savings
in the model.6 The inclusion of labour supply is important for two reasons. Firstly,
labour supply is the utilisation of human capital and so directly impacts the returns.
Secondly, endogenous labour supply decisions result in earnings fluctuations so
without modelling labour supply explicitly the measure of risk would be upward
biased. The inclusion of savings is important as it provides a channel through which
individuals can self insure; moreover, without savings the effect of labour supply
on achieving consumption smoothing would be greatly exaggerated. The model is
similar to Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) who estimate a life cycle model with
consumption, labour supply, job mobility, employment risk and wage risk. They
are interested in the insurance value of different welfare programs and do not look
at the decision to go to college nor do they include information related to family
background or ability. The model also borrows from Blundell et al (2013) who
examine the effects of in-work benefits on female labour supply and human capital
accumulation by allowing for education specific returns to experience to capture
the dynamic effects of labour force participation and unemployment. Their paper
focuses solely on females and they do not allow for employment frictions.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to have an education choice
model with early measures of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills, parental back-
ground information and a rich earnings process capturing human capital accumu-
lation, labour market risk and allowing for savings. Related papers looking at risk
in education include Altonji (1993), Chen (2002), Abbot et al (2013), Athreya and
Kartik (2013) and Brown et al (2013). While each of these papers allow for risk to
6While they do let unobserved heterogeneity enter the model by allowing for 4 types of individuals they do
not explicitly model the affect of cognitive and non-cognitive ability on college decisions.
95
affect college returns, the majority of these papers do not incorporate rich measures
of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, allow for employment risk or estimate an
earnings process with endogenous human capital accumulation. Moreover, Brown
et al (2013) are the only paper to allow for employment risk in addition to wage
risk.7 However, Brown et al (2013) are only interested in the ex-post risk-adjusted
return to college and do not model the education decision or allow for heterogene-
ity in individual traits. The paper is also related to the literature that looks at the
effect of cognitive ability on returns to education including Griliches et al (1972),
Blackburn and Neumark (1993), Murnane et al (1995), Cameron and Heckman
(1998), (2001), Taber (2001), Caneiro and Heckman (2002) and Hendricks and
Schoellmann (2009). Finally, the paper is also related to the work by Heckman et al
(2006), Blanden et al (2007), Conti et al (2010), Heckman et al (2014), and Hai and
Heckman (2015) by allowing for non-cognitive skills to play a role in the college
decision. However, these papers are less interested in the effect of risk. The paper
that is closest in spirit to this paper is Navarro (2013) which allows for savings,
psychic costs and specifically models the education decision. The paper is inter-
ested in the amount of uncertainty in college earnings which is known in advance.
However, the paper is different to this paper as it does not model labour supply or
allow for employment risk and thus implicitly assumes that lifetime labour supply
is education invariant.
In the paper, I find that risk, grants, cognitive and non-cognitive ability have a
substantial effect on the decision to go to college. In particular, I find that a decrease
of 10% in the variance of college wages leads to a 2.87% increase in participation
and an increase in grants by 1,000 leads college participation to rise by almost
2.14%. However, the biggest impact on college participation comes from policies
which alter individual traits before college. Giving the high school graduates the
same distribution of cognitive ability as college graduates leads college attendance
to rise by just roughly 20%. This is driven both by differences in returns to college
conditional on ability and by the larger psychic costs faced by those with low ability.
This suggests that policies aimed at early childhood investment are key to increasing




The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the data, section 3 contains
some reduced form analysis, section 4 describes the model, section 5 discusses the
estimation, section 6 conducts come policy analysis and section 7 concludes.
4.1 Data
I use the National Child Development Study 1958 (NCDS) which follows a sam-
ple of approximately 17,000 individuals born in Great Britain in a week in March
in 1958. The NCDS contains rich data on family background, education, work
experience, earnings and test scores. I limit the sample to males only.8 The in-
formation on cognitive ability relates to reading, mathematics, general ability and
motor ability tests taken at different ages. I use the mathematics test score at age
11 as my measure of cognitive ability. The test comprised of 40 questions relating
to numerical and geometric ability. I take the total score and dichotomise it in to a
high or low variable. The dataset also contains comprehensive non-cognitive mea-
sures. The school teacher is asked to fill out the Bristol Social Adjustment Guide
(BSAG) which is a range of questions relating to the child’s behaviour in school
at ages 7 and 11. The questions can be grouped together to pinpoint what form of
behavioural disturbance is most relevant for the child, for example, unforthcoming-
ness, hostility, anxiety, restlessness and inconsequential behaviour. I use the total
score on all questions at age 11 and dichotomise the combined score in to a binary
variable to form my measure of non-cognitive ability. The depth of questions re-
lated to behaviours provide an advantage over many other studies which examine
non-cognitive skills using, for example, the NLSY which has limited questions re-
lated to non-cognitive skills.9 In addition, another important advantage of using
questions which are asked to the teacher results in less anchoring issues/reference
bias than if the student answered the question directly and less subjective bias than
if the parent answered the questions.
Questions relating to the mother and father’s highest level of education are also
8A credible analysis of female college participation would require an enhanced model allowing for fertility
decisions and part-time work.
9Hai and Heckman (2015) use 3 questions including whether had under age sex, whether stole something
worth more than 50 dollars or whether attacked someone.
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asked. I combine the highest level of education for the mother and father and then
dichotomise the variable. As alluded to already, parental education is an important
factor in education decisions. This may be due to innate ability which is passed on to
the child, the availability of financial resources to pay for education, or the attitude
towards education which is created within the household. There are questions which
elicit how interested parents are in their child’s education. Teachers are asked how
interested they think the mother is in the child’s education and also asked about the
father’s interest. On top of this, parents are asked directly if they wish the child
had been able to leave school at fifteen. This question was asked since the 1958
cohort was the first cohort which faced the new minimum school leaving age of 16.
I use these 3 questions to form an index relating to the parental interest in the child’s
education and split the index in to a high or low binary variable. It can be argued
that parental interest in the child’s education will affect the child’s decision to go to
college but should not impact wages conditional on cognitive ability, non-cognitive
ability and parental education. Therefore this variable provides an exogenous source
of variation in the model to help identify the returns to college.
One caveat to using the cohort studies is that information is only collected at
several points in the life cycle: at birth and at ages 7, 11, 16, 23, 33, 42, 50 and 55. 10
Therefore, I impute earnings for the years when the individual is not surveyed. The
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the General Household Survey (GHS)
are two other UK datasets which overlap with the life cycle of the NCDS cohort.
The BHPS started in 1991 with almost 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals
in the UK. I use the first 18 waves of the BHPS covering the period 1991-2008
and use variables such as region, mother’s highest education level, father’s highest
education level, education, and sex to predict earnings in the NCDS. The GHS is
a cross sectional survey which started in 1971 and surveys approximately 9,000
households and about 16,000 adults in the UK. I use the GHS to impute earnings
before 1991. The variables I use to do this include region, father’s social class,
education, and sex. Having created the life cycle earnings profile of the individual
I trim the top and bottom 1% of earnings in each year and deflate to 2012 prices
10At the moment there is work to use the individual’s social security number to infer earnings for the years
unobserved.
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using the UK Retail Price Index. To obtain labour market experience over the life
cycle I use retrospective questions in the NCDS which ask about previous periods
of employment and non-employment. This allows me to create a life cycle profile
of the individual’s work experience and labour market history.
The early test score measures are a great advantage of using this dataset since
one of the main criticisms of papers looking at returns to education is the endo-
geneity of education due to the fact that those with higher ability are more likely
to receive higher education but it is likely they would earn more anyhow regardless
of whether or not they obtained more education. Most studies in the literature try
to address this problem by using a clever instrument (see Card 1995 for a review),
but as Imbens and Angrist (1994) have shown, most of the time this will just lead to
identification of a local average treatment effect, i.e., the treatment effect for those
most sensitive to a change in the instrument which may not be policy relevant. Other
papers in the literature such as Cameron and Heckman (1998), (2001) and Cameron
and Taber (2004) use the NLSY which contains test scores but these are taken from
ages 15 to 18 and so maybe confounded with education and likely will not pick
up raw ability. Therefore using the NCDS provides me with a unique advantage to
plausibly control for ability bias.
4.2 Reduced Form Analysis
Before delving in to the model, it is useful to start with some reduced form analysis
to gain some insight in the importance of certain parameters both for the college de-
cision itself and for earnings. To start with I show some simple correlations between
cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability, parental education and parental interest. Fig-
ure 1 contains graphs depicting the effect of parental education on each of the other
variables. As expected, there is a positive gradient for each of the variables; those
in the top tercile of the parental education distribution display higher cognitive and
non-cognitive ability and also tend to have parents who have a higher interest in
their education.11 Those from the top tercile of the parental education distribution
are a lot more likely to have higher cognitive and non-cognitive ability and greater
11In the figures parental interest refers to the sum of the responses to both father and mother interest in the
child’s education and whether the parent’s want the child to leave school at age 15 to form a parental interest
score. More details are provided in the appendix.
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parental interest than those in the second tercile whereas the differential between
the second and bottom tercile is not as substantial for each outcome.
Figure 4.1: Cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability and parental interest by parental education
Figure 2 shows the correlation between cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability
and parental interest. Those in the bottom tercile of cognitive ability display lower
non-cognitive ability and are also less likely to have parents with a strong interest in
education. The differential in non-cognitive ability between the bottom and middle
tercile is a lot bigger than that between the middle and top tercile and so it seems
that those in the lower end of the cognitive ability distribution display lower non-
cognitive skills but the differential on other parts of the distribution is not large.
Figure 4.2: Non-cognitive ability and parental interest by cognitive ability
Lastly, figure 3 displays the relationship between non-cognitive ability and
parental interest. The is a positive relationship between the two variables with those
in the higher non-cognitive ability tercile more likely to have parents interested in
education.
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Figure 4.3: Parental interest by non-cognitive ability
Next, I turn to the relationship between each variable and college attendance.
Figure 4 dispays this information. As expected there is a positive relationship be-
tween each variable and college attendance. Individuals with high cognitive ability,
non-cognitive ability, parental education and parental interest are more likely to go
to college and the effect is monotonic across the terciles of each distribution. Cog-
nitive ability in particular seems to have a large effect on college attendance with
those from the top tercile more than 4 times as likely to go to college as those who
are in the bottom tercile of the ability distribution.
Figure 4.4: College by cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability, parental education and parental in-
terest
Table 1 shows a regression of log earnings at ages 33 and 42 on a dummy
for college (with the base category being high school graduate), average years of
parental education, cognitive and non-cognitive ability. Since the cohort studies are
measured only at certain points in the life cycle, I chose to focus on the two ages
when males are most likely to be in the labour market. This also has the advan-
tage of showing how standard returns to education differ if earnings are measured
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at different points in the life cycle. I first show the return without any controls. It
should be noted that the low sample size as compared to the original sample size of
17,000 individuals is due to the fact that I only focus on males which reduced the
sample by half and I also condition on at least a high school degree. Given that a
non-trivial amount of individuals born in 1958 leave school without any qualifica-
tions this again reduces the sample size by over 30 percent. The remainder is due to
missing observations on any of the variables in the model. Across both ages college
graduates receive a significant increase in earnings: 27% at age 33 and almost 33%
at age 42. The higher returns at older ages is consistent with findings by Bhuller,
Mogstad and Salvanes (2013) who study the life cycle bias present in measures of
returns to education. This also shows the importance of looking over the whole life
cycle which the structural model that I present in the next section will take into ac-
count. In columns 2 and 4, I show how selection on ability and family background
may play a role in the large returns by including parental education, cognitive and
non-cognitive ability in the regression. The returns to college fall by almost 42%
for at age 33 and by almost 34% at age forty two. This is quite a staggering decrease
in returns and shows the importance of controlling for individual characteristics and
in particular cognitive ability. The estimates lend credence to the so called ”ability
bias” that may be affecting many reported estimates of returns to college. It is clear
that those who have higher ability are more likely to go to college but would receive
higher earnings independent of their education status. While I cannot control for
other unobserved determinants which may be affecting both earnings and college,
in an effort to gain some insight in to how much unobserved heterogeneity if left,
I add a host of other variables to the regression including birth order, number of
siblings, whether smoked at age 16, father’s social class at age 16, birth weight and
other ability measures such as reading at age 11, math at age 7, copying design test
at age 7 and non-cognitive measures at age seven. Surprisingly, the coefficient on
college barely changes at all once with the addition of these other variables. While
this may suggest that controlling for measures such as parental education, math test
and non-cognitive measures at age 11 does a good job at soaking up the effect of
omitted variable bias it may still be the case that there are other important unob-
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servables which may be omitted. Nonetheless, I think this exercise illustrates how
important controlling for cognitive ability is when measuring returns to education.
Table 4.1: Regression of Log Earnings at Ages 33 and 42
Log(earn) at 33 Log(earn) at 33 Log(earn) at 33 Log(earn) at 42 Log(earn) at 42 Log(earn) at 42
College versus HS 0.2369∗∗∗ 0.1376∗∗∗ 0.1347∗∗∗ 0.3148∗∗∗ 0.2092∗∗∗ 0.2123∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0315) (0.0312) (0.0437) (0.0453) (0.0460)
Father Age Left School 0.0260∗∗ 0.0159 0.0282∗ 0.0186
(0.0101) (0.0110) (0.0151) (0.0160)
Mother Age Left School 0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0045 -0.0082
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0159) (0.0162)
Math at 11 0.1136∗∗∗ 0.0760∗∗∗ 0.1259∗∗∗ 0.1083∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0253) (0.0237) (0.0322)
Non-Cognitive at 11 0.0210 0.0151 0.0390 0.0221
(0.0162) (0.0172) (0.0281) (0.0285)
Reading at 11 0.0097 -0.0236
(0.0254) (0.0299)
Non-Cognitive at 7 0.0225 0.0551∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0248)
Math at 7 0.0347∗∗ 0.0057
(0.0173) (0.0232)
Copying Design at 7 0.0031 0.0240
(0.0138) (0.0209)
Number of Siblings -0.0160 0.0036
(0.0099) (0.0156)
Birth Order -0.0013 -0.0357
(0.0150) (0.0224)
Smokes at 16 0.0511∗ 0.0367
(0.0300) (0.0456)
Father Social Class at 16 0.0895∗∗∗ 0.1060∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0425)
Birth Weight 0.0192 0.0116
(0.0142) (0.0213)
Observations 1110 1110 1110 939 939 939
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. The math, reading, copying design and non-cognitive variables represent the
standardised measure of each variable. The birthweight variable is also standardised. Smokes at 16 is a binary variable denoting whether the individual




Individuals complete high school/A-levels at age 18 then decide whether to enter the
labour market or go to college in the next period – at age 19. The decision depends
on expected benefits and costs including idiosyncratic tastes for education. College
lasts for 3 years after which individuals enter the labour market. Each period an
individual is subject to an unemployment shock if employed and a job offer arrival
if unemployed. After observing these shocks he must decide whether it is optimal
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to work or not. Individuals retire at age 65 and face a mandatory spell of retirement
of 10 years at the end of life where they consume their savings and receive the state
pension. The date of death is known with certainty and there is no bequest motive.
4.3.2 Utility
The agent wishes to maximise the present discounted value of lifetime utility subject













γ is the coefficient of risk aversion, ηs represents the disutility from working and
Pst is an indicator variable denoting whether the individual is employed or not. s
denotes education, all other parameters of the model are education specific (the
discount rate and coefficient of relative risk aversion are the only ones not) so from
now on I drop the s subscript.
4.3.3 Budget Constraint
While in college assets are a function of the current interest rate plus the amount of
grants received. 12
at+1 = (1+ r)at+g(t)− ct
12In the UK in 1976 local education authorities paid all fees which amounted to 375 pound per year. While the
amount of grants was means tested and therefore individuals did not receive the full level of grants (although all
students received at least 50 per year) since I do not have data on parental transfers I assume that all individuals
received the full level of grants. Therefore, I am assuming that the amount of transfers given by parents whose
income was above the threshold for grant eligibility, was equal in value to the amount of the grant.
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When the individual has left education assets accumulate depending on the
interest rate and whether or not they are employed. If they are employed they get
an income (y) but if they are not in employment they just receive unemployment
benefits (UI).
at+1 = (1+ r)at+Ptyt+(1−Pt)UI− ct
I do not allow individuals to borrow as in the UK in 1976 it wasn’t very com-
mon for individuals to borrow particularly since there was no fees.
at+1 ≥ 0
4.3.4 Earnings Process
The earnings process is education specific and composed of a permanent and tran-
sitory component:
lnyit = Y +β1Cogi+β2NonCogi+β3Expit+β4Exp2it+uit+ vit
vit = ρvit−1+ζit
The unobserved income shocks uit ∼ N(0,σu2t ) and ζit ∼ N(0,σζ 2t ) are inde-
pendent and serially uncorrelated. I assume the transitory component uit is just
measurement error and only focus on the permanent component vit in estimating
the model. Blundell et al (2008) show that the transitory component can be easily
smoothed over time and so I focus on the permanent part which has the biggest
welfare effects. Moreover, in the model I allow for job destruction which usually
constitutes the main part of transitory shocks and I have trimmed the top and bottom
1 percent of earnings which is largely affected by measurement error.
Endogenous experience accumulation depends on labour force participation
and the rate of depreciation. Experience depreciates in each period at the rate δ .
However, an individual can increase his stock of experience by participating in the
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labour market.
Expist = Expist−1 ∗ (1−δ )+Pist
4.3.5 Value Functions
Let I denote the agent’s information set which is composed of time, education,
assets, experience, the permanent wage shock, cognitive and non-cognitive ability,
parental education and parental interest in education. Labour market frictions enter
the model via job destruction and job offers. In each period the individual may
lose their job, the probability of which depends on their education level. Similarly,
each period when an individual does not have a job they will receive a job offer
which depends on their level of education. I assume that both the probability of job
destruction and job offers are constant over the life cycle.
The value functions conditional on employment status are as follows:
V et (I) = maxc
[U(cit ,Pit = 1)+β (piEtV ut+1(I)+(1−pi)Etmax(V et+1(I),V ut+1(I)))]
V ut (I) = maxc
[U(cit ,Pit = 0)+β ((1−ω)EtV ut+1(I)+ωEtmax(V et+1(I),V ut+1(I)))]
where pi is the probability of job destruction and ω denotes the probability of a job
offer, e denotes employment and u denotes unemployment.
4.3.6 Education Decision
Agents make their college choice by comparing the expected present discounted utility
of leaving school with just a high school degree against the value from choosing to enter
college which depends on the costs of college Ci. This decision is made when the agents
have just completed high school and depends on the initial joint distribution of assets,
cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability, parental education and the parent’s interest in their
education. Parental education and parental interest do not enter the earnings process and so
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act as exclusion restrictions which help to identify the model parameters. The intuition is
that conditional on cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability and parental education; parental
interest only acts to affect the individual’s decision to go to college but has no effect on
earnings or utility other than via it’s effect on education thus providing exogenous variation
in the college decision.
Ed = max((EVhs|I18),(EVcg|18, I18)−Ci)
Ci = β0+β1cognitivei+β2noncogi++β3pareduci++β4parinteresti+ εi
Here ε comes form a normal distribution with mean zero and variance to be estimated within
the model, I18 denotes the individuals’ information at age 18 which includes assets, ability,
parental education and parental interest and Ci denotes the costs of schooling.
4.4 Estimation
I use a two step estimation approach. In the first step, I calibrate a set of parameters us-
ing estimates from the literature. In the second step, I use indirect inference (Gourieroux,
Monfort and Renault, (1993)) to estimate all the remaining parameters.
θˆ = argmin
θ
(Mˆd− M˜s(θ))′W (Mˆd− M˜s(θ))
In practice, I match a mix of coefficients from regressions as well as data moments in order
to estimate the parameters. A full list of moments and coefficients used in the estimation is
provided in the appendix. The aim of the algorithm is to minimise the distance between the
data moments and the moments got from simulating the model. I start with an initial guess
for the parameters and compute the distance between the model and data moments and then
keep updating the parameters until the distance between the data and simulated moments
has converged to close proximity. I use a diagonal weighting matrix with the inverse of the
variance of moments on the diagonal. Altonji and Segal (1996) have shown that using the
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efficient variance-covariance weighting matrix leads to biased estimates in finite samples.
More details on the computation is contained in the appendix.
4.4.1 Calibration
I calibrate the coefficient of risk aversion γ to be 1.56 which is similar to findings by At-
tanasio and Weber (1995) and Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994). I set the interest rate
to 0.015 and the discount rate equal 0.98 implying that the individuals have some degree
of impatience. I calibrate unemployment benefits to be 3728.40 for those aged 25 and over
and 2925 if under age 25. This corresponds to the annual UK unemployment benefits in
2012 prices which for simplicity I assume can be received for the full period of 1 year. I set
the pension income equal to 5727.80 which is equivalent to what a person with 30 qualify-
ing years (years in which national insurance contributions were paid) at flat rate of 110.15
per week would obtain. I set the depreciation rate to 10% similar to what Fan et al (2015)
have found using a structural model with labour supply and endogenous experience and











Experience Squared -0.0015 -0.0023
(0.0093) (0.0068)
Cognitive Ability 0.123 0.20
(0.031) (0.0313)
Non-Cognitive Ability 0.0786 0.0339
(0.0311) (0.0302)
AR Parameter 0.87 0.914
(0.0367) (0.0111)
Variance of Permanent Shocks 0.06 0.0436
(0.0196) (0.0093)
Labour
Tastes for Work 0.23 0.2354
(0.0318) (0.0557)
Probability of Job Offer 0.3459 0.5087
(0.0393) (0.0638)
Probability of Job Destruction 0.0137 0.0129
(0.0072) (0.0131)












Standard Deviation of Unobserved Taste 0.3627
(0.0261)
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Unsurprisingly, I find that college graduates start out in the labour market commanding a
higher level of earnings than what high school graduates earn when they enter the labour
market for the first time. Not only do college graduates receive a higher level of earnings at
the beginning of their work lives but the growth in their earnings is also faster resulting in
steeper earnings profiles for college graduates. However, the earnings profiles flatten out a
lot quicker for the college graduates.
An interesting feature of the model estimates is the finding that the return to cognitive
ability for college graduates (20%) is nearly double the return for high school graduates
(12.3%). This implies that college and ability are complementary with those with higher
ability receiving larger returns. Conversely, the return to non-cognitive ability is 7.86%
for high school graduates but only 3.39% for college graduates with the latter estimate not
significantly different from zero. The higher return to non-cognitive skills for high school
graduates may be due to the fact that the jobs high school graduates obtain rely more on
soft skills. However, it is still puzzling that the non-cognitive skills do not seem to pay
off for college graduates. Hai and Heckman (2015) using the NLSY97 and controlling for
schooling find that returns to non-cognitive skills are not significantly different from zero.
Turning to the risk parameters, I find that the job destruction rate is only slightly higher
for high school graduates, 1.37% versus 1.29%, which may be due to the fact that I am
looking at males with at least a high school degree born in 1958 whom tended to have a
high labour market attachment. However, college graduates receive job offers at the rate of
50.87% while it’s only 34.59% for high school graduates. Therefore, as expected college
graduates do receive less employment risk than their high school counterparts. However,
the overall variance of the earnings is slightly higher for college graduates consistent with
the idea that higher returns come at the expense of higher risk. Although the variance of
permanent shocks is smaller for those with college the persistence parameter of 0.914 is
large enough to make the overall earnings risk larger for college graduates.
I find that those with greater cognitive and non-cognitive ability, parents with higher
education and parents who are more interested in the child’s education face a lower psychic
cost of going to college. Similar to Navarro (2011), I find that cognitive ability is the main
determinant of the psychic cost function. The larger returns to cognitive ability for college
graduates combined with the lower psychic costs for those with high cognitive ability imply
a large degree of college sorting by ability.
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4.4.3 Compensating Variation
I now use the parameter estimates to calculate a return to college education. Since I am
working with a utility framework it is not reasonable to just look at the difference in lifetime
earnings. Therefore in order to find the return to college which takes a comprehensive
account of all parameters of the model I measure a type of compensating variation. This got
by finding the constant fraction of per-period consumption a college graduate would have









Table 4 displays the compensating variation for a range of subgroups. The overall
compensating variation is 18.8% which means that a college graduate would have to be
compensated by almost one fifth of his per-period consumption to make him indifferent be-
tween high school and college. There is quite a lot of heterogeneity in the compensating
variation with those with higher ability having the largest compensating variation of 27.7%
and those with the lowest ability needing only 11.2%. The compensating variation differen-
tial between high and low non-cognitive ability is not as large as the payoff to non-cognitive
skills is larger in the high school labour market than the college labour market although the
psychic costs to college are lessened for those with greater non-cognitive ability.
Table 4.4: NCDS 1958 Cohort Compensating Variation
Compensating Variation PDV(Y)
Overall 0.188 0.28
Low Cognitive Ability 0.112 0.244
High Cognitive Ability 0.277 0.322
Low Non-Cognitive Ability 0.184 0.304
High Non-Cognitive Ability 0.192 0.259
Low Parental Education 0.172 0.274
High Parental Education 0.222 0.292
Low Parental Interest 0.168 0.274
High Parental Interest 0.204 0.285
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Table 5 displays the proportion attending college conditional on ability and family
background variables. Consistent, with the fact that the largest returns to college are ob-
tained by those with higher cognitive ability, I also find that the biggest proportion attending
college is those who are high ability with just over 35% of the high cognitive ability group
going to college. On the other hand, just under 17% of the low cognitive ability group at-
tend college. Not surprisingly, those with higher parental interest, higher parental education
and higher non-cognitive ability are far more likely to attend college that those in the low
groups.
4.4.4 Heterogeneity in College Attendance
Table 4.5: NCDS 1958 Cohort College Attendance
College Proportion
Overall 0.2531
Low Cognitive Ability 0.168
High Cognitive Ability 0.352
Low Non-Cognitive Ability 0.208
High Non-Cognitive Ability 0.292
Low Parental Education 0.216
High Parental Education 0.327
Low Parental Interest 0.20
High Parental Interest 0.295
4.5 Policy Experiments
One advantage of using a structural model is that it is possible to do policy experiments. I
conduct several policy experiments to gain insight in to the main determinants of college
participation. Firstly, I look at the effect of a 1,000 pound increase in grants.13 I find that
such an increase in grants leads college attendance to increase by 2.14%. This is similar to
Deardon, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2011) who use variation in the level of real grants in the
UK and find that a 1,000 increase in grants leads to a 2.6% increase in college attendance.
Decreasing the variance of the college permanent wage shock by 10% leads to an
increase of 2.87% in college participation.14 This is quite a large effect and suggests that
risk may be an important reason for the low college participation rate, particularly for those
13There is a large literature looking at the effect of changing tuition on college attendance (Kane (1994),
Dynarski (2002), Avery and Hoxby (2004) and Epple et al (2006), Blanden and Machin (2004)) and the evidence
is quite mixed.
14I also look at the effect of increasing the variance of the permanent shocks by 10% and find a decrease in
college participation of 2.72%. Abbot et al (2016) analysing the same policy experiment using US data find a
decrease of 2.5%.
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from less well off backgrounds whose parents do not have a buffer stock of savings to
insure against low returns. From an intergenerational perspective this may be a reason
for the low education mobility found in the UK (Blanden and Machin (2013)); if risk is
deterring students from less affluent backgrounds from going to college this will tend to be
perpetuated until steps are taken to alleviate this risk.
Changing the job destruction rate and the job offer rate have negligible effects on par-
ticipation perhaps due to the already high labour market attachment of this sample of males.
A 20 % increase in unemployment insurance leads to a modest decrease in partici-
pation since unemployment insurance favours high school graduates to a larger extent as
they represent a larger share of predisplacement income and also they are more likely to be
unemployed and so this increase helps raise the returns from being a high school graduate.
This result highlights the difficulty in balancing the act of reducing poverty but at the same
time providing incentives for college attendance.
Table 4.6: NCDS 1958 Cohort Counterfactuals
% ∆ College Proportion
Increase Grants by 20% (1,000) 2.14
Decrease College Variance of ζ by 10% 2.87
Decrease College Job Destruction by 10% 0.04
Increase College Job Offer by 10% 0.12
Increase Unemployment Insurance by 20% -0.32
Looking at the effect of the initial distribution of traits which individuals enter the
labour market with, it is evident that there is a large return to altering some of these traits.
For example, if high school graduates had the same distribution of parental education as
college graduates then college attendance would increase by around 7%. While it is hard to
change the parents education in any short term setting, one thing which could be targeted
is the parent’s interest in the child’s education. This could be implemented through the
use of mentoring programs for parents concerning the merits of education, disseminating
information etc. As an upper bound, I look at the effect of increasing the parental interest
of those high school graduates who have low parental interest, roughly 52%, and find that
this would cause college participation to increase by almost 9 percent. Avvisati et al (2014)
examine a field experiment in Paris which attempts to increase the level of parental involve-
ment in the child’s education. Since the focus is on student’s in 6th grade, examining the
effects on college attendance is not possible for now; however their results showing that the
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program led to improved levels of literacy and better outcomes in terms of both attitudes
and behaviour in school suggests that this may also have an effect on future college atten-
dance.15 The main advantage of a policy like this is that cost-benefit analysis makes such
a policy particularly appealing. Providing mentoring programs to parents once a week and
distributing information leaflets are a cost effective way to increase college attendance.
Lastly, I look at the impact of changing the initial high school distribution of cogni-
tive and non-cognitive ability to match that of college graduates. I find that the return from
changing the cognitive ability is quite substantial resulting in an increase in college partic-
ipation of over 20%. This is driven both by the larger cognitive ability returns for college
graduates and the lower psychic costs faced by high cognitive ability individuals. The effect
from changing the non-cognitive distribution is an increase in college attendance of 4.4%
which is not as large due to the lower returns to non-cognitive skills for college graduates.
Table 4.7: NCDS 1958 Cohort Counterfactuals
% ∆ College Proportion
Set HS Parent Educ Dist = Coll Dist 7.07
Set HS Parent Interest Dist = Coll Dist 5.81
Set Parental Interest to High for Everyone 8.81
Set HS Cognitive Ability Dist = Coll Dist 20.43
Set HS Non-Cognitive Dist = Coll Dist 4.39
While I find that wage risk and grants have non-negligible effects on college partic-
ipation; similar to Keane and Wolpin (1997), I find that in order to substantially increase
college participation it is best to focus on improving the traits with which students enter
college. This suggests policies aimed at building the foundation of skills at early ages will
have the biggest return. 16. There have been many experimental studies which provide ev-
idence that interventions at early ages can lead to a increased cognitive and non-cognitive
skills, for example, Doyle et al (2016) find evidence that an early childhood intervention in
Dublin led to significant effects on childhood cognitive development and the effect opened
up at age 18 months and continued up until the last wave of data collected at age five while
Fryer, Levitt and List (2015) find evidence that parental investment has a significant effect
on non-cognitive development.
15The treatment increased average grades on all subjects by .08 standard deviations on tests scores by teacher,
however there was no effect on standardised tests which maybe due to reasons of subjectivity of the teachers or
effort by the students since they know the teacher measured tests will be sent home to their parents whereas the
standardised tests will not.
16There is evidence that cognitive ability is malleable up until the age of eight (Heckman (2005))
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4.6 Conclusion
Getting more individuals to go to college has been the aim of government policy for quite
sometime. But where should policies be targeted? In this paper I estimate a rich structural
model incorporating savings, labour supply, endogenous human capital accumulation, wage
risk, employment risk and psychic costs of college attendance. I estimate the model using
British data containing early age measures of both cognitive and non-cognitive ability as
well as unique information on parental background. I find evidence that returns to ability
are higher in the college labour market highlighting the complementary that exists between
education and ability. I also find evidence that those with higher cognitive ability face
substantially lower psychic costs of attending college and this combined with the fact that
the returns to ability are larger for college graduates leads to a large degree of college sorting
by ability. This is consistent with reduced form evidence I present which illustrates that
failure to control for ability may lead to an upward bias in returns to college of around 40
percent.
I use the model to conduct some policy analysis and find evidence that policies such
as decreasing the degree of wage risk facing a college graduate or increasing the amount
of grants awarded will lead to an increase in college attendance of between 2 to 3%. How-
ever, the biggest return is got from policies which focus on altering the environment of the
student before she enters college. As an upper bound, I find that policies which get parents
of all high school graduates to have a high interest in their child’s education would lead
to almost a 9 percent increase in college attendance. This could be implemented via men-
toring programs, dissemination of information about the school and so on, policies which
may be quite cost effective. Lastly, I look at counterfactuals examining the effect of chang-
ing cognitive and non-cognitive skills of the student. Specifically, I find that if high school
graduates faced the same non-cognitive skill distribution as college graduates then the pro-
portion going to college would increase by almost 4.4% while doing the same experiment
for cognitive skills would lead college attendance to increase by 20 percent. This is due to
the higher returns to cognitive skills in the college labour market and to the lower psychic
costs faced by those with higher cognitive skills. This suggest that policies focusing on rais-
ing the cognitive skills of students at early ages will prove most fruitful which is consistent
with the findings by Heckman and others which show that the biggest returns to policy is
through early childhood investment.
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The NCDS is the best dataset available to answer this question since it covers almost the
entire life cycle of the individual - at present data is available up until age 55 and in addition
contains rich measures of ability and family background. While the situation facing the
1958 cohort may not be applicable to other cohorts or indeed other countries, it is neverthe-
less one of the only datasets which contains such rich individual information and spanning
such a long period of time and therefore I think the NCDS is the best dataset to answer this
question.
A little bit about the set up facing the NCDS 1958 cohort. At this time, tuition fees
amounted to 375 but were paid in full by the local education authority regardless of the
individual’s parental income. In addition, grants existed to help fund living expenses but
they were means tested according to parental income. The requirement to get in to university
was a minimum of 2 A-levels which meant that not everyone who wished to go to college
could attend. It can be argued that by not modeling the supply side, the results may be
misleading since there may have been a capacity constraint. While it is hard to obtain
information on the amount of individuals who would like to have gone to college but did not
get in due to rejection or due to the fact that they were discouraged from applying because of
capacity constraints, I think this is more of an issue for earlier cohorts. The Robbins Report
in 1963 recommended a large expansion of UK universities ”on the principle that there
should be a place in higher education for every student with the appropriate qualifications
and motivation” and as a result in the 1960s 8 new universities were established17, some
other institutions converted to university status and the Open university was opened which
facilitated distance learning. Also, Chao Fu (2012 ) finds that increasing the supply of
colleges has very limited effect on college attendance.
Model Fit
NCDS 1958
17These univerities are sometimes referred to as ”plate glass” universities due to the glass exterior; examples
include Warwick univeristy and Sussex university
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Table A1: Comparing Simulated and Data Moments - NCDS 1958
Data Model
Proportion Going to College 0.2526 0.253
Variance of College Distribution 0.187 0.189
HS Coeff on Lagged Yt-1 in Regression of Yt on Yt-1 0.869 0. 872
CG Coeff on Lagged Yt-1 in Regression of Yt on Yt-1 0.911 0.909
HS Coeff on Exp in Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability 0.064 0.067
CG Coeff on Exp in Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability 0.098 0.0831
HS Coeff on Exp Sq in Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability -0.0013 -0.0012
CG Coeff on Exp Sq in Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability -0.002 -0.0017
HS Coeff on Cog Ability in Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability 0.117 0.122
CG Coeff on Cog Ability in Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability 0.191 0. 20
HS Coeff on Non-cog Ability in Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability 0.072 0.068
CG Coeff on Non-cog Ability in Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability 0.037 0.04
HS Variance on Residual from Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability 0.246 0.242
CG Variance on Residual from Reg of Yt on exp, exp2, cog and noncog ability 0.254 0.251
HS Mean Unemployment to Employment Transition 0.256 0.346
CG Mean Unemployment to Employment Transition 0.40 0.609
HS Mean Employment to Unemployment Transition 0.016 0.024
CG Mean Employment to Unemployment Transition 0.011 0.041
